I finally have decided to return to writing after months of hiatus being preoccupied with university. Given that I have relocated to London, I believe I may end up covering more global affairs than I had previously, and likely will pivot to covering more domestic matters. But do expect more to come!

Donald Trump’s actions in both Venezuela and the newest war with Iran have successfully reversed twenty years of foreign policy humiliations, inactions, and catastrophes—and have quelled any notion of the United States’ superpower status being ceded. If one had told previous architects of U.S. interventionism in 2004—Bill Kristol, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, and David Frum—that it would be the host of The Apprentice and a man who plasters his face and name onto steaks and vodka who would topple the Ayatollah and potentially his Islamic Republic—the most powerful of the ‘Axis of Evil’—one would scarcely imagine they could comprehend it.

Throughout this term—and his previous one—critics of the left have relentlessly attacked Mr Trump’s foreign policy as lacking any moral foundation, coherent strategy, or basic stability (at times calling it downright erratic and reckless—talk of annexing Canada and Greenland springs to mind, though that was almost certainly the president just trolling). His rhetoric and actions routinely infuriated the pundit class: those who still worship the post-war internationalist consensus, who cling to human rights conventions and international law like sacred scripture. Yet their endless inaction has done nothing except grant malicious regimes licence to violate those very conventions with complete impunity. This is the same crowd that sneered at Ronald Reagan for daring to call the Soviet Union “an evil empire” and for any serious effort to confront communism or terrorism. They preferred endless concessions dressed up as “détente”—in spite of the irrefutable evidence that, had the U.S. pressed harder and earlier, the Iron Curtain might have fallen a decade sooner. They were wrong then. They’re wrong again now.

Similarly, critics from the “neoconservative right” have oft similarly humiliated themselves with their endless frustrations at Mr Trump’s lack of commitment to ideologically based regime change or ideological fawning over institutions like NATO, or support for Ukraine. Such criticisms are unfounded. Mr Trump has, arguably, done more for NATO than any president in living memory—being the first to demand all member states meet their spending commitments—and being the first president to authorise lethal aid for Ukraine, likely preventing the government in Kiev from collapsing during the 2022 invasion.

Mr Trump will be, without question, the most consequential U.S. president of this era—and due to the inflammatory nature of his person and conduct, his accomplishments likely will never be fully appreciated—yet it is incredible, his success in achieving peace agreements and successful regime change in instances not believed possible.

In his first term, Mr Trump brokered the Abraham Accords, resulting in Israel achieving diplomatic relations with Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Sudan, and Morocco—and moving closer to Saudi-Israel normalisation—without making any progress on Palestinian statehood, despite previous belief such a feat was in the realm of impossibility. National Security Advisor John Bolton and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo—the maximum pressure sanctions campaign—avoided granting the mullahs any legitimacy, and decided only through the strength of Israel, and the Arab states—rallied by Mr Trump—bringing Tehran to heel would any agreements be achieved. Had Mr Trump bought into the framing that Palestine was the singular issue at the forefront, it is unlikely such a coalition could have been mustered. And though, due to his electoral defeat in 2020, and the divergence from this policy under President Biden, the success was apparent—the regime’s reserves fell 94pct—$66b—ignited protests against the government, and hindered Tehran’s ability to supply its proxies—Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and Iraqi Shia militias. The result was a relative calm in the Middle East from 2018 to 2023.

Contrasted with the policies of Ben Rhodes and President Obama, who believed that elevating Iran to a regional power by allowing its nuclear ambitions at a later time and enabling the procurement and building of ballistic missiles would counter both Israel and Saudi Arabia and enable Tehran to compel Israel to withdraw from the West Bank. In the minds of Mr Obama and Mr Rhodes it never occurred that Tehran could be toppled by indirect or direct force, but that there was an inevitable legitimacy surrounding the Ayatollah and that only through peace could Iran’s nuclear ambitions be deterred. Mr Trump’s current success in neutralising the Ayatollah and the bulk of his leadership only shows how American foreign policy regarding the regime—from President Carter with the hostages in ‘79, President Reagan’s failure to respond to the Beirut bombings, the execution of torture of CIA chief William Buckley and SW2 Robert Stethem in 1985, and President Bush’s failure to retaliate for the torture of Colonel Higgins in 1989—could simply have been solved with an air strike. It is truly as straightforward as that.

For irrespective of how this current intervention turns out and whether American forces are compelled to invade Iran, the reality is that Mr Trump has his finger on the pulse for how to effectively mount regime change. Mr Trump has done more than any president in living memory to shake off the “Iraq Syndrome” that has plagued the United States since the unsuccessful military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan of the second Bush administration. The Venezuela operation, conducted meticulously, was prime evidence of the efficiency of the United States military and the success of regime change when deployed effectively.

Rather than waste ten years battling insurgents, billions in rebuilding, and trying to convert foreign populations to Western liberalism while air dropping corrupt leaders like Hamid Karzai who had lived outside the countries for decades to micromanage, the Trump approach is simply to remove elements of a government that are undesirable and elevate those, from within the previous government, who can be reasoned with. Acting President Delcy Rodríguez is from the same ideological bend as Maduro, his Vice President, and in spite of this similarity has freed political prisoners and opened up the country to U.S. investment and oil. Without losing a single American soldier, or expending resources in a complicated transition of governments, rewriting of constitutions, and quelling resistance forces—America simply removed the hostile actor and replaced him with a mild one.

Pearl clutching about international law will likely cease as realpolitik emerges once more as the dominant state of the world. I would argue that this is a development for the best and that worship of the post-war settlement and its institutions has often been excessive and detrimental, doing more harm than good. If the United States can remove a hostile regime, one guilty of numerous humanitarian violations and acting to harm the United States, then why shouldn’t it? Why should those who flagrantly violate international law and commit unspeakable atrocities find themselves under its protection? The West should tackle these regimes the same way it tackled communism under Reagan—by halting them, not trying to change their behaviour. “We win, and they lose.”

Irrespective of whatever happens in Iran, for that is uncertain, and it is likely the war will be prolonged, comfort can be taken that Mr Trump has clearly shown that he will not bog himself in the nation building of yesteryear—that was evident when he ruled out endorsing the the Shah’s son to the throne—and expressed his preference for a more moderate voice from within Iran’s regime, likely from within the IRGC, to be the one to run Iran. It would be wise for the Trump administration’s foreign policy team, steered by the extremely effective Secretary Marco Rubio, to be pragmatic, rather than rigid, with what comes in the wake of the Ayatollah’s demise. For whatever replaces him, no matter how different, is certainly for the best—and be it next week, months, or a year from now the Islamic Republic’s days are numbered and for the first time in a half century hope beckons for the Iranian people and those who wish for a peace in the Middle East.

From my foreign perspective, I would characterize the state of Canada as dysfunctional and underperforming. Canada’s economy has languished for a decade, dragged down by Justin Trudeau’s policies that, at best, were misguided and, at worst, deliberately harmful. Consider the energy sector: Canada holds oil reserves 10 times larger than the United States’ but produces 40 pct less crude, hampered by emissions caps and drilling restrictions which deterred investment. Oil and gas investment has halved since the Liberals took power in 2015, while Mr Trudeau’s carbon tax raised energy costs, curtailing demand for Canadian oil. When Russia’s 2022 invasion cut Europe’s energy supply, Canada failed to capitalize, unable to ramp up exports and forgoing billions in potential revenue.

The broader economy tells a similar story of stagnation. Real GDP per capita grew by just 1.1pct from 2014 to 2024, trailing the United Kingdom which grew by 6 pct, France by 7 pct, and the United States by 19 pct. Aggregate real GDP rose 17 pct, but this was driven entirely by immigration-fueled population growth, masking per capita decline. The United States, by contrast, achieved 27 pct GDP growth, with parallel gains in per capita income and productivity—areas where Canada faltered. Labor productivity in Canada crept up by 4.9 pct over the decade, hobbled by underinvestment and a shift to low-skill sectors. Immigration, which surged 227 pct from 260,000 to 850,000 annually, overwhelmed housing and infrastructure, doubling costs and pushing unemployment from 5.7 pct in 2019 to 6.4 pct in 2024. Youth unemployment, at 13.5 pct, reflects the strain.

Immigration has become a flashpoint, its second-order effects—soaring housing costs, strained services, and stagnant wages—stemming from Liberal mismanagement. To counter an ageing workforce, the Liberals relied on low-skill migrants, shifting Canada’s economy toward low-productivity sectors like retail and services. This depressed wages, squeezed out young workers, and drove productivity to a standstill. Mr Trudeau hailed immigration as creating “the world’s first post-national state”, and his ministry credited it with averting a 2023 recession. Yet this ignores the plummeting living standards: the average Canadian is poorer, with no real wage growth despite GDP increases.

Today Canadians are voting across the country, and while the Westminster model is a multi-party system, there will be one party of two who commands a majority in the House of Commons—the incumbent Liberals, led by former Bank of England and Bank of Canada governor Mark Carney or the Conservatives, led by former Shadow Finance minister and Leader of the Opposition Pierre Poilievre. Only one deserves to lead. Mr Carney’s Liberals haven’t earned it; they’ve squandered a decade on spin and profligate spending, leaving Canada as a country that is not just failing to keep pace but worse off. Had I a vote to lend, I’d back the Conservatives—or any candidate best positioned to deny the Liberals a majority—to give Mr Poilievre the chance to repair a broken economy.

Mr Poilievre is the change Canada needs, a supply-side reformer focused on productivity and efficiency—the only path to prosperity. His 15 pct income tax cut, slimmed-down state, and deregulation push would spur capital investment. To tackle housing costs, exacerbated by immigration, he pledges to scrap sales tax on new homes under C$1.3 million and cut municipal construction taxes. He also champions inter-provincial free trade, absent in Canada unlike the United States, where the Dormant Commerce Clause ensures seamless commerce. Canada’s provinces trade more with the world (66 pct) than each other (34 pct), as a result of these barriers. Mr Poilievre’s plan to dismantle trade barriers would boost efficiency, with the Conservatives planning to utilize increased tax revenues towards education and healthcare.

Energy is Mr Poilievre’s boldest pitch. His “Canada First National Energy Corridor” would fast-track pipelines, rail, and infrastructure, slashing approval times to six months and engaging the indigenous First Nations tribes to share economic gains. Repealing Bill C-69, a Liberal law that stalled projects, and scrapping the industrial carbon tax would revive oil and gas, unlocking billions in exports to Asia and insulating Canada from U.S. tariff threats. A C$1 billion investment in Ontario’s Ring of Fire would tap critical minerals, bolstering energy transition industries. Mr Carney, by contrast, advocates phasing out oil and gas, offering no clear alternative for lost revenue or jobs.

Under the Liberals, productivity and wages have stalled, despite doubled national debt and unprecedented immigration. The average Canadian has little to show for it. Mr Carney, though new to the helm, carries the Liberal mantle, offering more of the same despite polished rhetoric and patriotic ads. His C$130 billion spending plan risks further deficits—with no growth to show for it. If rejecting the status quo is the goal, only the Conservatives, under Mr Poilievre, embody anti-establishment credentials.

Polls show a tight race, with Liberals at 41 pct and Conservatives at 38 pct, buoyed by a “rally ’round the flag” effect from U.S. tariff tensions, though the Tories have seen a surge in the 11th hour. Only Mr Poilievre’s political revolution can deliver powerful paychecks, energy sovereignty, and engineer an economic renaissance. It’s time for Mr Poilievre to fix what the Liberals broke.

Those who draw the ire of Nancy Pelosi usually find themselves out of a job. And one of the top stories of this week was the highest-level Senate Democrat, Chuck Schumer, finding himself in her crosshairs. "I…don't give away anything for nothing," said Ms Pelosi. "I think that's what happened the other day."

To say Mr Schumer has had a bad week would be an understatement—it's becoming abundantly clear that he, along with his party, are engaging in a fight over who shall hold the reins. The seeds of discontent were sown when, penning an opinion article for The New York Times, Mr Schumer explained his decision to support the Republican budget—declaring it to be better vis-à-vis an alternative hardline proposal. This is, in all essence, sensible politics. Mr Trump has been electrifying headlines and torching markets with his trade war, which could be a potential lifeline for the Democrats.

Expending political capital on a government shutdown, which Mr Trump would pounce on as a "far-left effort to wreck our big beautiful country", would be premature at this point. Mr Trump's approval rating, in spite of tariff mania, is holding strong. Opposition leaders should know when and how to pick their battles—it's clear that Mr Schumer is holding for the hook, likely closer to 2026 and the midterm elections.

But Democrats have not been persuaded. Democratic Representatives Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Jasmine Crockett seized [the opportunity]. Ms Ocasio-Cortez critiqued Mr Schumer directly: "It is almost unthinkable why Senate Democrats would vote to hand the few pieces of leverage that we have away for free," describing the sentiment of her party as feeling "a wide sense of betrayal." Ms Crockett said it more bluntly, "I definitely think younger, fresher leadership may be something many Americans may be looking for, especially in the state of New York." Social media throughout the week, and the past few months, has been full of rage at Mr Schumer and the Democrats, viewing them as never bothering to fight—in spite of all the rhetoric about the "threat" Trump poses.

Discontent is brewing. And those of us who have occupied the right side of the spectrum know what it is. An establishment leader in the Senate not adhering to the wishes of an impassioned grassroots against an opposition president they despise—history has repeated itself.

Off the heels of Donald Trump's trouncing of Kamala Harris in November, Democrats are left scattered and disarrayed; the so-called "resistance" to Trump has been virtually non-existent, and the viability of their party is precarious. Demographic trends, which saw Hispanic voters, the nation's second-largest and fastest-growing ethnic group, shift to the right, from supporting the Democrats with 65 pct in 2016 to a mere 50 pct in 2024, [contributed to this]. Democrats faced a collapse with men of all races and lower-income voters. A diverse working-class coalition of old and young had prevailed.

It's exactly the same as what happened in 2008—when Republicans were trounced, written off for dead politically, amid the ascent of Barack Obama to the presidency, who, like Mr Trump, was a larger-than-life cultural force. John Judis and Ruy Teixeira's The Emerging Democratic Majority predicted that Democrats' strength with young voters, Hispanics, and college-educated voters would bring about a period of Democratic domination—after 2008, the book seemed prophetic.

And when one remembers 2008, one sees a high number of parallels between the campaigns of John McCain and Kamala Harris—both good and bad. A convention bounce, an 11th-hour polling lead that never was, solid debate performances, a gaffe-prone vice-presidential nominee, and activist discontent within the party. An unpopular president, Bush then and Biden now, sank their respective parties to the point where they lost the White House and the Senate simultaneously, and with the opposition possessing the House, ceded a trifecta. Post-Obama, the Republicans were left rudderless. Picture a civil war, in which a fragile government (that being the Bush administration) had collapsed, and the country (the GOP) had splintered into three factions: grassroots voters angered at the government spending and the Obama agenda, that being the Tea Party; Reaganites who would toe the party line; and the establishment wing typically found reading and writing for The Weekly Standard.

The Tea Party movement spawned with anger that was directed at Mr Obama but more so at their own party—the more activist wings were infuriated at Congressional Republican capitulation on expensive stimulus packages and a perceived lack of fight directed at the president. This climaxed in the 2010 midterms, which were dominated by primary challenges against "RINOs" (Republicans-in-name-only). In Pennsylvania, arch-conservative Pat Toomey ousted the "Rockefeller Republican" liberal Arlen Specter in the Senate race; in New York's gubernatorial primary, businessman Carl Paladino beat out the establishment favorite Rick Lazio; and in Delaware, activist Christine O'Donnell beat the centrist and longtime congressional incumbent Mike Castle in the Senate primary.

There were numerous other primary challenges, and of the aforementioned, excluding Mr Toomey, all would end up losing—many of the Tea Party backed candidates had serious personal detriments and were, bluntly, unelectable. In spite of this, Republicans netted a gain of 63 seats in the House and 6 in the Senate. Ultimately, the Tea Party movement had noble, sensible, and necessary policy intentions but ended up solely existing to obstruct Mr Obama—no one sensible will deny this—and failed to implement anything from a list of unachievable goals.

The Democrats are in a more precarious position. Republicans, shortcomings and all, still entered 2009 with a favorability of 40 pct; the Democrats today boast a 29 pct favorability rating, with 54 pct of Americans holding an unfavorable opinion of them—which is incredible given the smaller scale of Mr Trump's triumph when contrasted with Mr Obama's. The party boasts an identity problem; which way do they go? Mr Obama executed a left-leaning neoliberalism, President Joe Biden drew his inspiration from Keynes with a more progressive interventionist approach, and Bernie Sanders, whose 2016 campaign captivated many, preached pure socialism. All three adhered to the now unpopular intersectional identity politics.

The defeat of Ms Harris, in my view, is the defeat of Obamaism—the nation's repudiation of the socially progressive professional-managerial class, in the same way the electorate repudiated the social conservatism and neoconservative foreign policy of Bush in 2008. 2008 was, one could argue, even a rejection of Reaganism. The "shining city on a hill", smaller government, peace through strength, that preached "small-c conservatism" of personal responsibility, and free-trade agenda found its champion in Mitt Romney—whom Mr Obama would comfortably defeat in 2012, in spite of a dismal economy and low approval ratings.

And there lie the problems for the Democrats today. It is likely that, should they opt to nominate, say, Gavin Newsom, he would likely lose in 2028—be it to Vice President J.D. Vance or whomever. The Democratic establishment has yet to embrace the precariousness of the situation, much as the Republican establishment did not heed the warnings of the Tea Party movement's popularity when they opted for Mr Romney (Mr Romney was still a strong candidate, and it is likely that 2012 was unwinnable for the GOP regardless).

And it's likely that, given this dissatisfaction, the Democrats will face a grassroots left-wing reckoning that will manifest against their amicable and moderately inclined incumbents in the midterms. We've read this book before—only the jerseys have swapped. And it likely won’t end well. The Tea Party birthed obstruction, not solutions, and primaried its way to a cruder congressional GOP. While Mr Trump's MAGA movement clearly revitalized the party's national electoral prospects, Republicans have never equaled there pre-Tea Party seat total. Democrats elevating progressive firebrands and ousting their establishment will likely yield the same result. The party's misdirected wrath at Mr Schumer proves it is less ideological—it's style, a hunger for leaders who'll swing, not stutter.

Tea's brewing, and it's bitter.

Callous, riddled with falsehoods, and incredibly dangerous—those are the words that best summarize President Donald Trump's plan to bring an end to the Ukraine war and his latest comments to reporters from his "winter White House" residence, Mar-a-Lago. Mr. Trump laid the blame on Ukraine for the war with Russia, their refusal to hold elections during wartime, and reiterated his disappointment at Ukraine's protest of not being invited to the peace talks, which commenced at the onset of this week between the United States and Russia.

In their haste to resolve the conflict, the Trump administration seems to have conceded almost everything to Russia—cessation of the Donbass region and Crimea (which always seemed likely), a withdrawal of American troops from Eastern European bases, sanctions relief, and no NATO membership for Ukraine—all of this without Vladimir Putin forfeiting anything. These have been Russia's demands from the beginning. The Russians claim, as always, that "NATO expansionism" is the all-powerful threat and that the Western Alliance exists as some belligerent force dead set on inflicting its wrath on Mother Russia. Reality paints a different picture; Ukraine joining NATO, and the alliance itself, does not threaten Russia's peace but rather Russia's ability to wage war.

The amateur nature of the negotiations, if they can even be called that, are hardly characteristic of the great negotiator who is purportedly the master of the "Art of the Deal." Mr. Trump is pushing towards ending the war so that he may boast the grandiloquence of his success in doing so vis-à-vis Joe Biden. Such is his desire that he will give up everything to achieve that aim—something Mr. Putin knows all too well and has factored in. It is a reasonable assumption that a former agent of the feared KGB would know how to prey upon personalities ripe with deficiencies.

Most distressing is the weakness in the face of Mr. Putin himself; Mr. Trump can't bring himself to denounce the bellicose despot who has sanctioned the indiscriminate bombardment of hospitals, energy grids, torture, civilian massacres, rape, and the execution of prisoners of war. Rather, he chooses to blame Mr. Zelensky for the allegedly heinous crime of defending one's way of life, the right of an ethnic people to safety and self-determination in their homeland in the face of odious Russian subjugation.

Vladimir Putin has not won, and Russia has not held a free and fair election since 2000—yet recently, Mr. Trump and Russia, who seek to insert a candidate sympathetic to the Kremlin, have fixated repeatedly on how President Zelensky hasn't held an election, even though Ukraine's constitution prohibits elections during martial law. The double standard is ridiculous.

Writing for the New York Post, Noah Rothman lamented the sickening desire of Mr. Trump to "squeeze the war-crippled country for all we can, simply because we can"—not only does Mr. Trump intend for Ukraine to capitulate in all but name, but he intends to exert a mafia boss-style shakedown for half of Ukraine's national wealth in the form of their rare earth minerals, in exchange for no security guarantees, which is a damning proposal. Perhaps Zelensky could leverage these materials in exchange for ascension to NATO, but it seems the Trump administration has ruled out that possibility from the start.

It is encouraging that Mr. Zelensky has indicated that any agreement between the United States without Ukraine's input will not be viewed as legitimate. Mr. Trump can dangle the threat of American aid, and indeed, the Ukrainians do rely heavily on the support of the United States—but Europe has been pulling its weight equally. If anything, Mr. Trump suspending aid would simply remove whatever leverage he holds over Mr. Zelensky, thus allowing the Ukrainians to seek more favorable peace terms independently.

European nations, notably the British, French, and Germans, seem willing to assume the burden of aiding Ukraine, based on recent talks in Paris, should the Trump administration pull aid for Ukraine, and of enforcing a peace agreement—though these states face a crisis of military readiness they must solve before enforcing any deterrence.

No one can deny the imperative of bringing about a lasting peace and ending this destructive conflict, but it is outrageous to blame Ukraine for being invaded, attempt to trivialize the atrocities committed by Russia, and to force Ukraine into a surrender agreement it neither desires nor can afford to bear. Ensuring Ukraine has as much leverage as possible and in no way legitimizes Russia's criminal behavior is paramount, and under those conditions, the Trump administration's peace talks have been a laughable failure that will eradicate whatever goodwill the United States still holds around the world and shatter the Pax Americana world order, perhaps irreparably.

Mr. Putin is not Hitler, this is not Munich, but the proposed surrender of Ukrainian lands to Putin without the Ukrainians having any say bears a frightening degree of similarity to the French and British surrender of the Czech Sudetenland to Hitler and Germany—this Munich Agreement was also reached without the consent and presence of the Czechoslovakian government. Perhaps Mr. Trump will cement himself as a redux of Neville Chamberlain, rather than the start of something new; a man so consumed by a desire for peace, with anything else being unacceptable, he naively plunged Europe, and the World, into its most destructive war and its darkest hour. Hardly the “peace for our time” that was promised.

Less than a month into his second presidency, Donald Trump has ignited a multipolar trade war with China, and the United States’ neighbors to its north and south—Canada and Mexico. The free trade stability of the past century now faces collapse, as populist and nationalist sentiment drives economic self-sabotage worldwide.

Chrystia Freeland, the former Minister of Finance and a Liberal MP, denounced Mr Trump’s unprovoked bellicose behavior towards Canada on CNN, describing it as a “betrayal of a friend,” inquiring, “What does Trump have against Canada?” and stating that “many Canadians are hurt” as a result of the actions.

Ms Freeland is correct—Mr Trump’s behavior is erratic and unprovoked. His grievance with Canada does not pertain to matters of trade but rather to impose blame and extract concessions, that may not exist within the realm of possibility, from Prime Minister Justin Trudeau as a result of fentanyl and other drugs entering through the United States’ northern border over the last four years.

The egregious dereliction of duty at both ends of the United States border, however, is the fault of the malpractice of former Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas, who was impeached by Congress for his failure to comply with and enforce federal immigration law, as well as his repeated lies under oath about the state of border security.

But Mr Trudeau and the Canadian people—nor even the government and people of Mexico—cannot be held liable for the incompetence of a previous cabinet secretary. In fact, both nations recently undertook measures to shore up their borders as a result of the new president’s ultimatum.

Mr Trump pressed forward regardless. Washington enacted the tariffs, set to take effect Tuesday, dealing a blow to markets, businesses, and consumers alike.

Free trade, though often demagogued against, has been the backbone of recent economic prosperity, and this forcible disruption will feed the cost-of-living crisis and reduce economic growth. Mr Trump calls tariffs “the most beautiful word in the English language,” claiming they will revive manufacturing, replace the income tax, and erase the national debt—an assertion as absurd as it is alarming.

Whatever benefit tariffs purport to gain in protecting sectors such as manufacturing is negated by increased costs on consumers and businesses, trade retaliation—which has already been announced by the governments of China, Canada, and Mexico—and reduced competition.

Artificially increasing costs, as a result of steel tariffs, will cause more damage to the economy at large—even if manufacturing production is protected. Per research from Brookings, the ratio is 600 to one—of jobs that were at risk as a result of Mr Trump’s previous tariffs in 2018 versus the number saved. In simpler terms, this means that while some firms benefit, a greater number suffer, leading to net job losses and economic inefficiency.

The forces of populist demagoguery like to attack economists and those who adhere strictly to free trade as academics without real-world experience or historical nuance. Yet, I previously explored real-world applications of tariffs in my article, “The Travesty of Tariffs.”

I wrote that the fixation on tariffs as a remedy for countering China's economic aggression, and in countering other unfair trade practices (excluding the fact that Mr Trump is imposing these present tariffs as a punitive measure for non-trade-related issues), is a misdiagnosis of the problem.

Tariffs are the bluntest and most self-defeating tool. Instead of erecting artificial barriers that harm consumers and businesses, the U.S. should lower corporate taxes, slash regulations, invest in infrastructure and skilled labor, and aggressively pursue trade agreements with key allies.

Most manufacturing job losses stem from automation. While innovation-driven disruptions can be painful in the short term, the same happened with unionized toll booth operators displaced by E-ZPass and other electronic means. Few protectionists would argue for reversing automation in other industries—no one is demanding a return to manual toll booths—yet they insist manufacturing should be an exception.

Competition with China’s labor-cost advantage has driven U.S. innovation and reinforced specialization under the law of comparative advantage—ultimately benefiting the economy.

For all intents and purposes, the United States remains a manufacturing powerhouse—an impressive feat for a nation comprising just 4.2% of the world's population yet producing 15% of global manufactured goods, making it the second-largest manufacturer in the world.

One of the most famous tariffs ever enacted, and often the crème de la crème example of macroeconomic wrongdoing, is the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930.

Then, similar to now, protectionist Republicans sought to protect the American agriculture and manufacturing industries with broad-based tariffs of 20% on over 20,000 goods. The result? Retaliatory tariffs from every nation—the harshest and most consequential from Canada (the irony, I am sure, is lost on the president).

U.S. exports plummeted by over 60%, and unemployment spiked from 6% in 1930 to 15% in 1931, and then to 26% in 1932.

While the decline in trade will not be as dire as in the past—due to the resilience of the modern global economy—the tariffs will still disrupt international trade and exacerbate already perilous supply chain issues. This will certainly increase costs for consumers and businesses alike, which is hardly a welcome consequence when the cost-of-living crisis is cited as the greatest concern of American citizens.

Another humorous claim comes from Mr Trump's belief that tariffs will replace income tax—$2.4 trillion of which was collected in 2024, whereas tariff revenue was roughly $233 billion.

The U.S. imported $3.2 trillion worth of goods in 2023, meaning that even with a blanket 25% tariff, the maximum revenue collected would amount to $800 billion—far short of replacing the income tax, with all the economic downsides included.

From 2018-2019, when China imposed retaliatory tariffs on American soybeans, U.S. farmers lost access to their largest market, forcing the federal government to introduce $28 billion in subsidies to offset the losses—more than was ever gained from Mr Trump’s steel tariffs in the first place.

The 1828 "Tariff of Abominations" was designed to raise revenue in a similar fashion. The economic consequences were so dire that South Carolina threatened secession over the damages done to its export-dependent agricultural economy.

The Wall Street Journal editorial board has dubbed the Great Trump Tariffs of 2025 “the dumbest trade war in history.” Indeed, this intentional self-sabotage cannot be rationalized under any serious economic thinking.

The political consequences of increased costs pushed onto Americans—with businesses forced to pass higher expenses onto consumers—could prove disastrous at the midterms. The Democrats, after their scathing electoral defeat in November, find themselves gifted a boon—a perfect opportunity for their new chair, Ken Martin, to capitalize on.

The Journal astutely pointed out how Mr Trump seems to flirt with autarky—a vision of America as a closed economy producing everything domestically with other nations forced to buy into its market. This is a fantasy detached from economic reality.

Modern supply chains are deeply integrated, so even a war between Ukraine and Russia leads to a higher cost of wheat in Latin America. Cross-border trade allows firms to source components efficiently and remain competitive—which is how firms, and the workers they employ, survive.

Forcing all production onshore through tariffs will lead to fewer jobs, not more. Free trade has reinforced industry, not decimated it, with auto production capacity expanding in tandem with imports.

It is, in fact, Mr Trump’s Tariff Tax that will hollow out America’s industry.

Yesterday, for only the second time in American history, Donald J Trump assumed the Presidency of the United States for a non-consecutive term—something that has not happened since Grover Cleveland in 1893.

Mr Trump first assumed the presidency in 2017—eight years ago, in what now feels like an entirely different era, politically and socially. Having bested Hillary Clinton in that election in a contest of who could get more votes against rather than for them, he narrowly eked out an electoral college win and fell short in the popular vote—amounting to only 46 percent.

A majority of the American people, and the political establishment of both parties, felt him to be an aberration who won by fluke. Mr Trump never managed to attain an approval rating above fifty percent. The cosmopolitan class of Washington D.C. insiders felt content to write him off as the president of the “rubes” and “deplorables.” Democrats felt energized and primed to recapture the presidency and usher in an FDR-style political transformation, while the Republican old guard viewed Mr Trump as an unwelcome vagabond who had captured their grand old party in a 1980s Gordon Gekko-style hostile takeover.

Amidst the backdrop of the “Make-America-Great-Again” right-wing populism that Mr Trump vehemently champions, economic leftism in the mold of Bernie Sanders made a resurgence that the United States hadn’t seen since the post-WWII Keynesian consensus, while the Obama-era and California coastal style of identity politics made a new emergence in many of America’s major cities—San Francisco, New York, and Los Angeles. Educated and higher-income voters began breaking away from the Republican party in the 2018 midterms, setting the Democrats up for victory in the presidential election two years later.

And when Mr Trump found himself fighting for his political life in the backdrop of the pandemic, inflamed racial tensions and riots stemming from the death of George Floyd, and an economic slump—against a strong candidate in the form of Joe Biden—few in the establishment were willing to stake their fortunes on him. On the contrary, many “heavy hitter” CEOs in tech, finance, and other sectors found themselves drawn to Mr Biden. After all, Mr Trump was an aberration—Mr Biden was predicted, the entire campaign, to be on course for a victory, and the “MAGA” tenure would prove to be a footnote on the return to “normalcy.”

After the chaos of January 6th, two impeachments, a disastrous midterm, legal battles, and even an assassin’s bullet, Donald Trump staged the greatest political comeback in U.S. history. With a commanding victory, he returned to the White House, his upset win leaving no doubt of its consequentiality. Republicans rode his impressive coattails to retain their majority in the House and to recapture the Senate. Mr Trump mended the fence with many business leaders who had seemed so vehemently opposed to him before, having had dinner with Bill Gates, and with Mark Zuckerberg, Jeff Bezos, and Elon Musk all in attendance at his inauguration—with Mr Musk emerging as the president’s most enthusiastic backer—something inconceivable eight years ago.

The Democrats seem to remain in denial about the scale of their defeat. The previous consolation in 2016 had been that Mr Trump had failed to win the popular vote. Having done so this time, the goalposts have shifted, with the newest soothing punditry emerging from MSNBC being that he “failed to attain a majority of the popular vote.” One doubts that piece of trivia was of much comfort to Kamala Harris, who was forced to watch the man who bested her assume the oath from the front row.

Not content to be a mere footnote, as if such relegation to the obscure was possible, Mr Trump emerged content to wield the power of the pen this time—enacting long-standing transformation was something he struggled with in his last term. A slew of executive orders were unleashed: securing the border, designating the Mexican drug cartels as a foreign terrorist entity, scrapping government-mandated diversity, equity, and inclusion initiatives, limiting new regulations, and repealing red tape regarding energy production.

His economic agenda bears similarity to the traditional “Reaganite” Republican orthodoxy of tax cuts, deregulation, and a revival of domestic energy production. And similarly to the 1980s, corporate America, once hostile and viewing Mr Trump as a braggadocious agitator, now finds itself in commonality with him. Lina Khan’s war on mergers during her tenure as Mr Biden’s head of the FTC likely burned what emerging reconciliation there was between the Democratic party and enterprise and entrepreneurship.

Mr Trump enters his second term at the height of his power. If he were Rome personified, it is presently the reign of Trajan, with the party reshaped in his image and much of the establishment grudgingly falling in line. The liberal resistance, once fierce, has largely faded into indifference, relegated to columnists and anchors for The Guardian and MSNBC—whose influence and reverence wane year-over-year. The biggest tell is the inaugural and post-election honeymoon; Mr Trump has emerged above fifty percent approval rating for the first time ever. But power is fleeting, and the real test begins now.

While executive orders can deliver swift action, history shows that true transformation requires lasting legislative victories. If Mr Trump only governs by executive order, Democrats merely will “wait him out” and undo his entire legacy with an equally powerful stroke of the pen. Thus, the onus is on Mr Trump to work with a fragile House majority and a stubborn Senate—that is aligned with him on taxes and deregulation, yet remains dominated by the “old guard” of the Republican party that proved so thwartful during his first term. His executive actions signal intent, yet legislation is the only means of manifesting one’s will.

Yet whether MAGA and Mr Trump will define American politics—cementing his place as a ‘great man of history’ like Reagan or Roosevelt—or merely serve as a precursor to an even more radical disruption remains uncertain.

The United States of America, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and South Korea were considered to be among the victors of the Cold War after the excision of the final vestiges of communism in Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union—these nations are undisputed leaders in defending liberal values, the rule of law, and providing economic mobility and an unparalleled standard of living. Militarily, with the exceptions of Japan and South Korea, the others, three of which are nuclear powers, comprise the most powerful militaries in the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, an alliance that President Joe Biden declared “the single, greatest, most effective defensive alliance in the history of the world.” Alongside their NATO commitments, the U.S., the U.K., and France boast permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council—effectively serving as the “world police,” much to the chagrin of intervention skeptics found on both the right and left sides of the political spectrum.

In late 1990, when the Iraqi despot Saddam Hussein invaded neighboring Kuwait, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and President George H.W. Bush moved the British and American armies to Saudi Arabia to join their forces and employ their nation as a means of a staging ground while utilizing their power within the United Nations to push for Iraq’s immediate withdrawal from Kuwait and providing the justification for the utilization of “all necessary means” to compel them toward such. Assembling the largest coalition since World War II—with participants from all over; Japan, South Korea, Argentina, Portugal, Niger, and Senegal—the million-man army initiated Operation Desert Storm, repelling Saddam’s forces out of Kuwait and pushing them back into Iraq—after inflicting devastating losses in what is considered among the most one-sided wars in the history of mankind.

Mr. Bush, in a speech to Congress after Desert Storm, declared a "New World Order" to defend liberal principles—peace, freedom, and the rule of law. 28 nations, from six continents, had formed a coalition of collective resistance against Saddam's violation of international law, and Mr. Bush stated that Americans had “a unique responsibility to do the hard work of freedom.” The twentieth century had opened with most Western powers entering a period of “splendid isolation” and undergoing internal political turmoil, yet it had ended on the precipice, and with the promise of, a new era in which the international community and the “leaders of the free world” would utilize their strength not toward the imperialist ambitions of yesteryear but to promote stability, protect international law, and politically steer the world in a more liberal direction. Liberalism seemed dominant, with Bush’s successor, President Bill Clinton, describing nations as being more interested in the “the power of our example rather than the example of our power.”

As we enter the new year marking a quarter of the way into the 21st century, the hopes for Mr. Bush’s 'New World Order' seem to have been, at best, dampened, if not entirely relegated to fantasy and fiction. The aforementioned countries appear shackled with their own problems; the size of their militaries has dwindled, many have found that their economies have been stifled—the EU’s share of global GDP has been steadily declining, the United States and United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Canada have faced social unrest and anti-establishment sentiment, which has culminated in an inability to govern—something that seems to be plaguing much of the liberal world.

One of the top headlines of this week came from South Korea, where President Yoon Suk Yeol declared martial law, relenting after a series of protests, and was subsequently impeached, which culminated in yesterday’s six-hour standoff that saw his bodyguards and military troops prevent authorities from arresting him at his residence. South Korea has had the greatest struggle in transitioning to liberal democracy; many recall that martial law had been invoked in the past by its military junta, yet the turmoil was still unexpected and concerning to say the least.

In France, the situation has not been as dramatic, but the government has effectively fallen with their legislature controlled by far-left socialists and right-wing populists, much to the chagrin of the centrist President Emmanuel Macron. The French political crisis resulted in a “vote of no confidence” in December, the first to succeed in sixty years.

Liberalism, which had seemed so ascendant, has buckled in the wake of universally despised levels of immigration, rising deficits and a crisis over pensions with the “silver tsunami” of aging populations, dwindling workforces, unpopular foreign wars, and overall dissatisfaction with the status quo. Populism seems to be the language of the West now, and much of their population's frustrations are targeted at “globalists” and internationalists; the idea of a “New World Order” receiving praise today is laughable. This shift is making it quite hard for the Western countries to govern, and it’s having ramifications that ripple across the globe.

In Germany, with civil unrest hot after a terrorist attack perpetrated by a Saudi national at a Christmas market in Magdeburg, the “traffic-light coalition” of Chancellor Olaf Scholz and his social democratic party has collapsed; Germany is headed for elections this year. Alternative for Democratic Germany (AFD), a nationalist populist party on the right, campaigning on popular anti-migrant, anti-Islamic, and anti-socialist economic policy, has surged in polling—much to the chagrin of the German political establishment. It is unlikely that AFD can win outright; Germany’s conventional political parties would likely form a coalition explicitly to counter them, but that’ll do nothing, if not aggravate, the grievances of their supporters.

Incumbent parties around the world have been tossed out; the United Kingdom saw a landslide victory for the Labour party, which ousted the Conservatives after fourteen years of rule, the Democrats were swept out of the White House, Japan’s Liberal Democratic party faced a humiliating result, and after economic stagnation, a housing crisis, authoritarian crackdowns against political demonstrators during COVID, and an unprecedented amount of mass-migration Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s tenure in charge of Canada is coming to an undignified end, with his Liberal party projected to face an “extinction level” defeat—likely going from 160 seats to five, if they are so lucky. In fact, Mr. Trump has reveled in the precariousness of Mr. Trudeau’s situation and has taken to “trolling” him, calling the Canadian Prime Minister the “governor” of the “51st state” after his pilgrimage to Mar-a-Lago, angering many Canadians who view the attacks as distasteful and disrespectful of their sovereignty.

And yet, even when a new party wins, their popularity and success are not guaranteed—Sir Keir Starmer’s Labour Party won 411 seats, the second highest result for Labour in their history, while the Tory party’s share of 23 percent of the vote and 124 seats is the worst performance for the world’s oldest political party. Flash forward to the end of 2024, and Sir Keir’s inaugural period has ended with him as one of the most unpopular prime ministers in history, with frustration over illegal migration, economic hurdles, the freebies controversy (with Sir Keir, his wife Victoria, and Deputy Prime Minister Angela Rayner failing to declare gifts from Lord Alli) among other things.

The 2025 budget by Chancellor Rachel Reeves sent gilts rising, inflation forecasts ticking upward, and powered anger from the public as a series of austerity measures have been undertaken. Most notably, and politically costly, was the winter fuel payment for pensioners which has been removed. One would think that the collapse of Labour’s popularity would be a boon for the Tories, as it has been in the past, but Labour’s main threat comes from Nigel Farage, whose Reform party has surged, surpassing the Conservatives in membership in December. Mr Farage has promised to “change politics forever” and lead “a revolt against the political establishment.”

And no one can ignore the return of Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States. Mr. Trump is possibly the most polarizing figure to have ever occupied the White House, and his return, this time on the precipice of a hard-won mandate from the American public, has shaken up not just power brokers in Washington but friends and foes alike. Mr. Trump recently had a call with Sir Keir where he blasted his “windfall tax” on energy firms, which resulted in American company Apache recently exiting the North Sea. Mr Trump additionally declared that the U.K. should “get rid of windmills!”

Sir Keir has stated his hope to have a good working relationship with the president-elect, but it may be complicated by his appointment of Lord Peter Mandelson as ambassador to the United States, who has called Mr. Trump “little short of a white nationalist and racist,” mirroring comments by British Foreign Minister David Lammy, who referred to Mr. Trump as a “tyrant” and “xenophobe” during his tenure in the backbenches.

This is not to say that such harsh comments are solely coming from Britain or Labour; recent comments from Elon Musk, one of Mr. Trump’s closest advisors and financial backers, against Sir Keir and his government—most notably with Mr. Musk criticizing several members of the Labour ministry, including Sir Keir himself (during his tenure as head of the Crown Prosecution Service) for their failure to prosecute “Pakistani rape gangs”—and his support for Reform and Nigel Farage have drawn the scorn of Westminster. Mr. Trump himself has reportedly complained in private that his British counterpart is “very left-wing”; one should be thankful that he never dealt with Jeremy Corbyn.

So, amidst the largest European war since World War II between Russia and Ukraine, the violations of Iran in the Middle East, and the looming threat of China’s imperial ambitions toward Taiwan, 2025 will be the biggest trial of the “special relationship” between the United States and United Kingdom. Japan and South Korea are consumed by political and social crisis, and the European nations face a crisis of confidence in the viability of liberalism itself. The West will be challenged in the coming year and in this century by those geopolitical challenges and by those that have yet to manifest, but it is impossible to imagine that in the wake of this populist insurgency (many of these parties blame the foreign policy establishment of the West for instigating the Ukrainian war) that the Western alliance would be as united in commonality as it was during the Gulf War in 1991.

The “new world order,” once heralded as the triumphant force shaping a peaceful, stable, and prosperous world, now faces an era of unparalleled turbulence and self-doubt. With liberal democracy buckling under the weight of discontent, economic stagnation, and geopolitical fragmentation, the question is not merely whether the West can recover its unity and purpose but whether it has the will to redefine its place in an increasingly dangerous and divided world. For the West cannot lead the free world if they cannot lead themselves.

President Donald Trump’s press conference was a sight to behold—and indeed president is the only appropriate way to describe his present status. This is not only an acknowledgment of his previous term but also due to the fact that he has, in effect, assumed the mantle of de facto president ahead of his January inauguration. The most impactful example of this came in the immediate weeks following the election, which saw Mr Trump embark on an overseas visit to France, where he met with French President Emmanuel Macron and other foreign leaders, including the Prince of Wales, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau—whom he later hosted at Mar-a-Lago.

At the beginning of this week, standing tall in that 58-bedroom estate, Mr Trump demonstrated a sharp grasp of policy and a calm demeanor that had often eluded him during his first term. His ability to engage off-the-cuff for over an hour, unaided by a teleprompter, signaled not only his exuberance but also a clear-cut contrast with the present-day commander-in-chief. Mr Trump's remarks opened with a $100 billion pledge from Japan's SoftBank, which he humorously tried to negotiate up to $200 billion with SoftBank’s CEO, much to the amusement of those present. Reiterating his positions on border security, trade policy, and his cabinet appointees, Mr Trump communicated an intent to deliver on his promises with an atypical gravitas.

Mr Trump came across as a leader more attuned to the responsibilities of high office. A marked contrast from the insouciant demeanor, vacuous policy, and erratic behavior with the media that defined his first term. Exile appears to have lent him wisdom, providing four years for reflection on his failings while also allowing him to rebuild the Republican Party. Typically, departing presidents—whether evicted by the will of the electorate or term limits—emerge as elder statesmen, pen a memoir, or retreat from center stage after defeat. Yet, Mr Trump made it abundantly clear, on the day he lost, that his exodus into the sunset was far from imminent.

Mr Trump had shown every intent of bearing the Republican standard one last time in the next presidential election. By doing so, he has broken precedent by establishing himself as something unprecedented in the American Republic—a leader of the opposition, as in the Westminster system. Although America’s non-parliamentary structure renders such a role non-existent, Mr Trump, through sheer willpower as a private citizen, effectively created it. From his role as a private citizen, he regularly held the Biden administration to account, posting criticisms and counter-policies on Truth Social—an effective digital substitute for the opposition bench.

Republican politicians sought Mr Trump's blessing in their respective campaigns, often emphasizing how they would work with him in a second term. Remarkably, he even whipped votes in Congress like a British party leader, most notably when he helped kill the Biden administration’s immigration bill. His tenure as kingmaker since 2021 has been comparable to losing an election yet staying on as party leader, a practice seen infrequently in the United Kingdom. An illustrative example is Labour Party leader Neil Kinnock, who opted to remain in leadership after his party’s crushing defeat to Margaret Thatcher’s Tories in 1987.

Much like Mr Trump, Lord Kinnock faced a leadership challenge ahead of the next election in 1992, ultimately defeating Tony Benn by a margin of 80pct to 20pct—similar to how Mr Trump prevailed in the Republican primary, defeating Nikki Haley 76pct to 19pct. However, Lord Kinnock offers only a limited parallel; he was an uninspiring leader offering little more than the failed politics of envy, resulting in another defeat to the Tories in 1992. In contrast, Mr Trump persevered through negative press, assassination attempts, civil and criminal cases, and the like, rallying not just his party but also the electorate behind him. Casting himself as a decisive leader with “common sense” policies, he found resonance with the American public.

Ahead of his second term, Mr Trump appears amicable and eager to mend fences with past adversaries. He has reportedly held productive conversations with figures such as Tim Cook, Mark Zuckerberg, and Jeff Bezos, the latter slated to meet the president today at Mar-a-Lago. Mr Trump joked, “In this term, everybody wants to be my friend. I don’t know. My personality changed or something.”

In all seriousness, Mr Trump understands why perceptions have shifted. Unlike his 2016 victory—a fluke of the Electoral College—this time, his track record and decisive electoral mandate have cemented his agenda as not merely his ambition but the nation’s expectation. Winning the popular vote, all the swing states, and securing a trifecta has legitimized his presidency in ways his chaotic first term never could. The relative quiet from his detractors attests to this transformation.

Democrats, who emerged from their 2016 defeat rallied and determined to resist Mr Trump, now appear resigned and fragmented, their opposition crushed. Infighting over the blame for their loss has ensued, and it seems many have realized that obstructing his now-popular agenda could prove more disastrous than it did previously. The Democrats risk being relegated to more than a decade in opposition unless circumstances dramatically change, as they often do in politics.

For now, voters have been afforded the opportunity to view Mr Trump’s policies without the cacophony of perpetual conflict. As a result, he enjoys a positive net favorability rating for the first time since announcing his campaign in 2015. While his trademark bravado remains intact, alongside the occasional foolish remark or frivolous lawsuit—such as the one against Ann Seltzer and The Des Moines Register over a poll he disliked—Mr Trump’s experience, combined with a public weary of his predecessors’ and the Democratic party’s mistakes, has lent him an aura of legitimacy and confidence.

The honeymoon will eventually end, as all do, and old battles will inevitably resume. But for now, Mr Trump's return has left voters feeling positive, hopeful, and committed. Only time will tell if the course will change.

In line with my desire to write about recent events in Syria, my writing has undergone a journey: what began as an informative article on last week's military offensive and my subsequent critiques of previous American foreign policy evolved into a brief history of Assad's regime. Eventually, it was consumed by a need for additional context, leading me to write a five-thousand-word history stretching as far back as the Old Testament. This is likely my lengthiest article to date. It is probably somewhat jarring due to its sheer scope and scale, which may have made it appear somewhat "erratic" in terms of organization and rendered it odd compared to my other writings. Nevertheless, I felt it would be a disservice not to include as much context as possible for what is arguably among the most misunderstood and complex conflicts of our time.

I have divided the article into four sections, each designed to flow cohesively within themselves. These can be read in one extended sitting with your morning cup of coffee or approached as though they were chapters in a book. I have endeavored to keep the historical sections—the first three—distinctly separate from the usual opinionated writing I offer. While they may not be entirely free of bias (for nothing ever is), I aimed to strike a tone of neutrality akin to what one might find in a college textbook.

In terms of accuracy, I suspect there may be some errors here and there, as I am not formally trained in history. However, given the urgency of publishing this article before circumstances shift—since the conflict is evolving rapidly and could render my commentary obsolete—I have applied the typical oversight that I do with any of my other writings. I can state that the material presented is as accurate as possible. I welcome any corrections that may prove otherwise.

Finally, I have opted to use portions of the Old Testament as a source in explaining the ancient history of Syria, for it is one of the few chronicles of this early time that we (being civilization) possesses. Some in mainstream academia may frown upon this choice, and it may invite disagreement about the historical authenticity of the scriptures. Still, please don’t e-mail me about it.

Part I—Syria's Foundations

On 16 May 1916, the seeds for the 21st century's second deadliest conflict were planted from the Sykes-Picot Agreement agreement, penned with the intent of divvying up the centuries-old Ottoman Empire's territories into varying spheres of influence with such negotiations concluding in hushed tones from the machinations of the foremost European imperialist powers—the British Empire and the French Republic, with Syria falling under the ever-widening umbrella of the former. Syria had been an integral province of the Ottoman Empire and prior to the Ottomans, and indeed, the emergence of Islam itself—Syria had been a crucial nexus for both the Abrahamic religions and ancient civilization.

While the modern country, like most, is a product of the last century, the contours of the Syrian nation-state began to take shape thousands of years ago with the civilizations of the Amorites, Arameans, Assyrians, Babylonians, and others who would inhabit the Levant. Stretching back their arrival in the 12th century B.C., the Bible makes specific note of the Arameans, a Semitic people who established city-states, such as Damesk, referred to as early as Genesis 14:15. The kingdoms of Israel and Aram-Damascus, as it was known at the time, came to blows during the reigns of King David and King Solomon, the Israelites waged wars with the Arameans (2 Samuel 8:5-6). David eventually subdued them, making Syria a vassal state, until the Kingdom of Israel’s capitulation to the Assyrian Empire.

The emerging and expanding Assyrian Empire consolidated these city-states into an imperial structure that would later be ruled by the Babylonians, the Persians, and Alexander the Great—his conquest taking place in the 4th Century B.C. Under the Hellenistic period, contemporary Syrian culture became characterized by the influence of Greek and Semitic cultures. Pompey the Great incorporated Syria into the Roman Empire in 64 B.C., resulting in the peak of its prosperity—with cities like Palmyra and Antioch becoming renowned as cosmopolitan hubs of intellectualism, trade, and splendor.

Roman Syria played a pivotal role in the spread of Christianity, with a significant portion of Jesus’ ministry taking place there. The oldest portrait of Christ was found in Syria in 235 A.D. Antioch (where Jesus anointed Peter the Pope) was among the earliest and most influential patriarchates of the fledgling Christian Church. Indeed, it was here that followers of Christ were first called “Christians.” After the Roman Empire was split in the 4th century, Christianity flourished, with varying monastic communities and churches found throughout Syria—though it was during this period the ugly head of sectarian conflict, something that defines Syria in the present-day civil war, emerged.

The Monophysite dispute emerged as one of the earliest theological disputes. Monophysitism, a fringe belief that Jesus could have only one nature, either human or divine, split the early Christian community, with adherents being declared heretics. The internal weakness left it ripe for conquest by the arrival of Islam and the subsequent conquest of Syria by Arab forces after the Battle of Yarmouk in 636 A.D., where Syria became a centerpiece of the Umayyad Caliphate. The advent of the Crusades in the late 11th century brought renewed tumult to Syria as the European forces of Christendom sought to reclaim the Holy Land. The establishment of Crusader states like the Principality of Antioch, after the success of the First Crusade in 1099, temporarily restored Christian rule, but it eventually fell to Sultan Baybars of the Mamluk Sultanate in 1268. Having repelled further Crusader incursions and defeating the Mongols at the Battle of Ain Jalut in 1260, Baybars secured Syria as a bastion of Islamic power.

It is incredibly important to note, particularly in understanding the present day civil war, that despite the rise of Islam and the persistence of Mamluk rule, both the Christian and Jewish populations of antiquity persisted, particularly in mountain communities and cities. Under Islamic law (sharia), both Christians and Jews are considered “People of the Book”, as descendants of Abraham, and thus designated as dhimmi—protected people. In exchange for protection of their life, property, and freedom to practice their religion, albeit limitedly, both Christians and Jews were obligated to pay the "jizya tax", a poll tax to compensate the state for the exemption of military service for non-Muslims, protection, and as a fee to maintain communal, but not political, authority in the Islamic state. Many Christians and Jews served as scholars, administrators, and translators in the caliphates, playing an essential role in preserving and transmitting classical knowledge to the Islamic world.

But they were still second-class citizens, dhimmi would be forced to wear distinctive clothing or badges, marking their religious identity, public displays of faith would be restricted, churches and synagogue construction was forbidden without express permission and such new constructions could not exceed mosques in height, and dhimmi testimony in court is inadmissible against that of a Muslim.

Tensions boiled over festering Islamic sentiment that Christians were present in administrative roles, the perception that they were economically privileged, and accusations of collusion with Crusader forces resulting in the status of Christians as dhimmi became more restrictive. These pressures manifested in anti-Christian riots in 1321 in Syria which led to the destruction of numerous churches and monasteries—local authorities often turned a blind eye to mob violence.

In 1516, Syria was absorbed by the Ottomans after the defeat of the Mamluks at the Battle of Marj Dabiq. Under the new Imperial Ottoman administration, the region was divided into several vilayets, including Damascus and Aleppo, and an unusually calm period of tranquility, stemming from membership of a vast and stable empire. The Ottomans maintained the dhimmi system, and tensions simmered. During the 19th century, Ottoman reforms known as the Tanzimat sought to modernize the empire and integrate its non-Muslim populations more fully. Syria's demographics remained stable for this period, a mosaic of the Abrahamic religions. Christians, who had historically formed the majority, were a sizable minority, concentrated in cities and the mountains alongside the Jewish population, with the majority of the country, obviously, being Sunni Muslim. Significant minority groups such as the Alawites, Druze, and Ismailis were similarly spread out among mountainous areas.

These reforms granted Christians and Jews legal equality in theory, proving incredibly beneficial to Syria’s Christian communities. Jewish communities in Damascus and Aleppo, prospered, save for a notable instance of persecution, such as the infamous Damascus Affair of 1840, This infamous episode involved the accusation of the city’s Jewish community of ritually murdering a Christian monk who had disappeared. Under European pressure, several Jewish leaders were tortured, and some were executed, with many Jews on the street being set up violently by the Ottoman population, thus reminding of the persistent vulnerability of minorities in the caliphate.

Part II—The Colonial Carve-Up & Struggle for Sovereignty

By the early 20th century, the Ottoman state was in decline, its authority eroded by internal dysfunction stemming from rampant corruption, a complete failure to compete with Western Europe’s industrialization, a lack of trade, and the rising tide of nationalist movements. The outbreak of World War I in 1914 proved to be the empire's final undoing. The Ottoman alliance with the Central Powers of Germany and the dual-monarchy of Austria-Hungary drew the ire of their principal opponents—Britain and France who saw the Levant as a strategically vital region for postwar dominance.

Taking advantage of the ensuing chaos, the Hashemite family of Mecca, led by Sharif Hussein, declared a revolt against Ottoman rule in 1916. This Arab Revolt, supported diplomatically and militarily by the British, was fueled by promises of Arab independence after the war. Sharif Hussein's son, Emir Faysal, later King Faisal I, played a pivotal role in the campaign, advancing with his forces into Damascus in 1918, aided by T.E. Lawrence and British forces, which led to the collapse of Ottoman rule in the region and fueled hopes for Arab self-determination.

In 1920, the Arab Kingdom of Syria, under King Faisal I, declared independence, only to be swiftly betrayed by the French. Unbeknownst to the Arab leaders, Britain and France had secretly ratified the Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916—Under this arrangement, Syria and Lebanon were assigned to France, while Britain secured control over Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq. The reign of King Faisal I lasted a mere five months before the French defeated his army at the Battle of Maysalun and sent him into exile.

Syria was then carved into a French Mandate under the League of Nations, with the French deliberately dividing the territory into sectarian sub-states to weaken nationalist aspirations. The era of French imperialism saw the seeds of Syria’s sectarian divisions sown, as the French relied heavily on minority groups like the Alawites and Druze to staff their colonial military apparatus, fostering resentment among Sunni Arab nationalists. Arab nationalist sentiments gained momentum and prominence during the subsequent interwar period, and with the weakening of French power as a direct result of World War II and the emphasis on decolonization and liberal internationalism from the world's new dominant superpower, the United States of America, Syria gained independence in 1946.

Unsurprisingly the newly independent government faced incredible challenges integrating diverse ethnic and religious communities while building a national identity, a process complicated by regional pressures and the fallout of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, in which the newly formed Jewish state repelled the seven armies of the Arab League, including Syria. Trial and error was the de-facto mantra of the regime, as in the new Syrian Republic’s first decade of existence, it had no less than 20 different cabinets and had drafted four separate constitutions—it’s emergent days can be defined by the successive military coups that resulted from the frequent conflict between the political elite and the military.

It is amidst this backdrop in the 1950’s that the Ba’ath Party emerges; advocating borderless Arab nationalism, socialism, and anti-imperialist sentiment. The intent of the founders–Michel Aflaq, Salah al-Din al-Bitar, and Zaki al-Arsuzi–was to form a pan-Arab nation state, united through shared national not theological sentiment, and strengthen their economic equality through socialism to counter the post-war Western order they believed had fragmented the Arab world. The Ba’athists specifically appealed to the rural poor and disenfranchised minorities, particularly Alawites and Druze, who saw the party as a vehicle for upward mobility and political empowerment; these groups could only be protected from discrimination through a pan-Arab vision that transcended religious lines. Christians, as is often the case, are not monolithic politically—many found the Ba'athist ideology of secularism and the rejection of sectarianism quite appealing while looking with disdain at the more radical socialist politics and authoritarian nature, which clashed with the wealthy conservative Christian population's interests.

The Suez Crisis of 1956 proved a pivotal inflection point for Ba’athist ideology, embodying the symbolic and literal collapse of Western imperialism and invigorating the Arab world’s now fervent pursuit of sovereignty and self-determination when Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal, triggered a military intervention by Britain, France, and Israel. In response to the intervention, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower placed a series of unduly measures on the British, threatening to sell U.S. holdings of the British pound—which would flood the foreign exchange market with pounds, thereby leading to a sharp devaluation of the currency—unless they withdrew and refused to supply the Western powers with oil, and worked alongside the Soviet Union in the United Nations to push for a ceasefire.

Though it was a decisive military victory for the Israeli-British-French triumvirate, the canal being captured with ease, they found themselves having exercised themselves for nothing, as the Egyptians had flooded the canal with sunken ships, thereby blocking all travel and making the Suez Canal, in layman's terms, useless. The subsequent failure of this intervention marked the end of the British Empire; the humiliation of the affair, combined with the lack of support from the United States, led to their self-relegation from superpower status and the collapse of Prime Minister Antony Eden’s government. Indeed, for both France and Britain, their status as European colonial influencers disintegrated, and this, in turn, bolstered Arab nationalism across the Middle East. Though defeated on the battlefield, Nasser's defiance against Western powers elevated him as a symbol of Arab resistance, inspiring movements like the Ba'ath Party to view him as the means of achieving their own nationalist and anti-imperialist objectives.

Syria’s union with Egypt in 1958 to form the United Arab Republic (UAR) under Gamal Abdel Nasser was a dramatic, if fundamentally flawed, experiment in Arab nationalism. What initially promised to be the fulfillment of a pan-Arab vision swiftly devolved into what many viewed as little more than a neo-Egyptian empire. Nasser sidelined the Ba’athists, dismantling their party structures and alienating critical Syrian constituencies. By 1961, mounting resentment over Egyptian domination led to the UAR’s collapse, yet another coup in Damascus, and the re-establishment of Syrian independence. To many, the Ba’athists might have appeared a spent force, their lofty dream of transcending borders and sectarian divisions to establish a secular, unified Arab republic seemingly shattered before it could fully take shape.

Yet history, often unforgiving in its irony, would prove otherwise. The Ba’athist movement had only just begun.

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Part III—The Ba’athists Strike Back

In March 1963, Syria underwent a watershed moment when the Ba'ath Party seized power through a coup led by a coalition of military officers and Ba'athist ideologues. One of the more influential figures in the party's military wing, Hafez al-Assad, benefited significantly from the regime change by being appointed Minister of Defence in the new government. Born on October 6, 1930, in Qardaha, Syria, Hafez al-Assad hailed from a modest Alawite family. He joined the Ba'ath Party at its founding as a student activist and later graduated from the Homs Military Academy in 1955 as an Air Force pilot. Though the coup had been successful, the Ba'ath Party's internal schisms began to emerge with the civilian wing, led by Salah Jadid, which emphasized socialism, strict ideological adherence, and cooperation with Egypt and Iraq started to clash with the militarist wing, represented by Assad, more focused on consolidating power within Syria and being less interested in the ideological.

Jadid’s civilian leadership quickly alienated many military officers, whose support was critical to maintaining his control of the country. As Defence Minister, Assad began building a loyal base from 1966 onwards within the armed forces, particularly among his fellow Alawites—many of whom were in the military. In November 1970, Jadid ordered military intervention to support Palestinian forces against the Jordanian monarchy of King Hussein. Still, Assad ostentatiously refused to commit the air force, citing operational and strategic concerns. In reality, it was a political move to undermine the authority of Salah Jadid and humiliate his government, to his success—though it is equally likely that Assad understood that direct intervention against King Hussein would draw the wrath of the United States and Israel, placing Syria in an untenable position and that by withholding the air force's support, which resulted in a decisive military defeat for Syria, would thereby prevent a detrimental success (that being Hussein’s defeat).

For over a year, Assad had become the true power in Syrian politics, and both he and Jadid were set on a collision course. Assad enjoyed immense popularity and loyalty from the armed forces and his strongest constituency came from Syria’s minorities, particularly the Alawites, who saw him as a protector against the Sunni-dominated opposition. It was becoming clear that a decisive power struggle was inevitable.

The tipping point came during the October 1970 Emergency National Congress. Jadid and his supporters sought to condemn Assad, stripping him of his posts, but they failed to account for the tanks and troops that Assad had positioned outside the congress hall. The delegates may have outvoted Assad on paper, but he held the only mandate that genuinely mattered: control of the army and the power of the long rifle.

As the Congress adjourned on, Assad’s men swiftly moved to arrest Jadid and his associates. The operation dubbed the “Corrective Movement,” was executed with surgical precision, avoiding bloodshed but simultaneously leaving no room for doubt about who ruled Syria. Jadid’s feeble final defiance, declaring that Assad would “be dragged through the streets” if power were ever reclaimed, was met with a lifetime prison sentence, marking the end of civilian Ba'athist rule.

Under Assad’s leadership, Syria began adopting a model of centralized authoritarianism designed to stabilize a country that was rampant with ethnic, religious, and political conflict. The “Assad bargain” became the way of Syrian life: political repression, brutal crackdowns of dissent, and the rise of the al-Assad family's hereditary rule and cult of personality were traded for stability, economic modernization, and protection of minority groups. Propaganda emphasized his military insight and wisdom and cast him as a benevolent defender of all faiths and as a champion of Syrian unity.

Hafez Assad understood Syria’s strategic significance as a frontline state in the Arab-Israeli conflict and used this position to cement his domestic and international standing. Hafez’s foreign policy was a masterclass in cold, calculated realpolitik, rooted in a vision of Syria as the linchpin of Arab power, manifested in his intervention in Lebanon’s civil war, which he turned into an arena for Syrian dominance. Intervening under the guise of stabilizing the conflict, Assad’s forces entrenched themselves as kingmakers, balancing Maronite Christians, Palestinian factions, and sectarian militias against one another while ensuring Damascus held the upper hand. Lebanon became less a neighbor and more a satellite—its sovereignty tethered to Syria’s strategic ambitions.

Meanwhile, Assad’s stance toward Israel was defined by a grim pragmatism. Publicly, he framed Syria as the unyielding champion of Arab resistance, as the noble defender of the Palestinian cause, refusing to cede the Golan Heights or entertain peace overtures that compromised his vision of Arab unity. Privately, his policy was one of containment—eschewing open confrontation in favor of supporting proxies like Hezbollah, leveraging the Palestinian cause, and positioning Syria as an indispensable player in any regional settlement. Assad’s foreign policy was not about achieving grand victories nor exporting any ideological sentiment but about securing Syria’s relevance, the survival of himself and his dynasty, and ensuring that no peace or war in the Middle East could proceed without Damascus holding the keys.

One of the defining moments of Assad's presidency was his response to the Muslim Brotherhood. This militant Islamist group has carried out terrorist attacks across the Middle East. It is designated as a terrorist group by the governments of Russia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Syria. It is represented most notably today by Hamas and is a vital opponent of the Assadist Ba'ath party. The Brotherhood was founded in 1928 to re-establish the Islamic Caliphate.

The Brotherhood began an uprising against Assad in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The Brotherhood’s insurgency culminated in the 1982 Hama massacre, which Assad crushed with overwhelming military force, resulting in tens of thousands of deaths. For three weeks, Syrian forces indiscriminately shelled Hama until it was nearly leveled and then sent boots on the ground in a prolonged door-to-door operation to eliminate Muslim Brothers, unsurprisingly resulting in the deaths of tens of thousands of innocents in the process.

The utter destruction of the Islamist uprising sent a clear message: dissent would not be tolerated, with Rifaat al-Assad, Hafez’s brother who commanded the operation, boasting about the number of casualties inflicted. The iron-fist approach maintained a relatively cohesive Syria until Hafez died in 2000 and the subsequent rise of his son, Bashar al-Assad.

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Part IV—Bashar, the Syrian Civil War, and the Present Day

Bashar al-Assad is the most unusual dictator in the world. His ascent to power is more similar to Michael Corleone's in Mario Puzo's The Godfather than any of his peers. At the end of the 1980s, Bashar al-Assad was an ophthalmologist at Western Eye Hospital in London, recalled by those who knew him as “geeky,” humble, and whom nurses thought phenomenal at reassuring anxious patients facing anesthesia. Bashar was an unassuming figure far removed from the political machinations of Damascus, more fascinated by the emerging internet and the power of computing. His elder brother Bassel, the family’s designated heir, was the quintessential strongman nepo baby—a bold, charismatic military officer groomed to inherit Hafez’s iron grip on Syria.

But Bassel’s untimely death in a 1994 car crash upended these plans, and the position of heir apparent fell to Bashar. Bashar was immediately recalled from abroad and thrust into Syrian politics. He enrolled in the military academy and underwent a crash course in statecraft and military strategy—under the stern eye of his father. In anticipation of his ascent, Alawite officers loyal to Bashar were placed in the military, favorable propaganda was spread about the new heir, and Bashar began his political journey as heir by attempting to introduce internet access to Syria, casting himself through action and rhetoric as a seeming reformer.

Upon Hafez’s death in 2000, the machinery of the Ba’athist state moved swiftly to clear the path for Bashar. The constitution was amended to lower the presidential age requirement from forty to thirty-four (Bashar’s age at the time). Within weeks, the mild-mannered doctor became the commander-in-chief of one of the most brutal and tightly controlled regimes in the Middle East.

Initially, the ascent of a doctor removed from Damascus's cutthroat internal politics inspired hope for reform. But this was quelled for various reasons; Bashar al-Assad's authority was anything but absolute. Loyal to his father's legacy, the old guard viewed the Western-educated leader with skepticism, if not outright disdain. Reports suggest that key military figures harbored deep reservations about Assad's leadership, with some allegedly conspiring to undermine his position.

This internal dissent compelled Assad to rely heavily on a coterie of trusted family members and close associates, further narrowing his support base. The Damascus Spring, marked by a brief flowering of political openness, was quickly extinguished as Bashar reverted to his father’s repressive tactics to cultivate a strongman image, ensure his survival, and remove dissidents. His new administration faced challenges with dramatic population growth, dwindling oil revenues, and the destabilizing effects of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 kickstarted more radical elements.

Domestically, Assad's economic reforms—characterized by a pivot towards a market-oriented economy—unwittingly exacerbated social inequalities. The dismantling of state subsidies and the rise of crony capitalism enriched a select elite while marginalizing the rural poor, combined with drought-induced agricultural collapse in the late 2000s, sowing seeds of discontent and kickstarting uprisings.

The eruption of the Arab Spring in 2011 presented an existential threat to Assad's regime. Faced with widespread protests demanding reforms, Assad perceived the unrest not merely as a political challenge but as a direct assault on his survival coming from a fragmented array of Western-backed opposition groups, Kurdish factions, and Islamist extremists. He was likely paranoid and incredibly concerned given the fate of other despots who faced interventions and popular uprisings such as Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi. Security forces were unleashed to quash dissent, employing brutal tactics that escalated the conflict into a full-blown civil war.

U.S. policies under President Barack Obama, often shaped by then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, called for Assad to step down, with Obama declaring, “Assad must go” and Clinton admitting that had she been president, “I would have taken on Assad.” The Obama administration’s early efforts included providing support to opposition factions that, given a failure coupled with a failure to vet rebel groups effectively and a lack of concern, allowed U.S. arms and resources to flow to jihadist groups.

American foreign policy in the Syrian conflict was marked by a simplistic narrative: Assad’s removal was paramount, and the opposition—viewed through rose-tinted glasses—was treated as an undifferentiated force of democratic aspiration. The opposition soon came to be dominated by Jabhat al-Nusra (Al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate) and ISIS. Weapons that President Obama said would be received by moderate democratic resistance groups often ended up in the hands of jihadists. For Assad, this reinforced the narrative that Western powers were backing forces intent on destabilizing the region and empowering jihadist groups to topple his secular government, inviting intervention from the governments of Russia and Iran—to support his regime and prevent a takeover by these elements.

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In the early hours of August 21, 2013, the Ghouta region near Damascus became the grim theater of modern warfare's most heinous act: a sarin gas attack that claimed the lives of over 1,400 civilians, many of them children. Since 2012, Ghouta had been a focal point of the rebellion with Jaish al-Islam and the Free Syrian Army holding territory here, thereby rendering it strategically critical and persistently contested, with combat entering into a stalemate. Assad's forces, escalating their campaign to secure Damascus periphery, targeted Ghouta with chemical weapons to break the deadlock and terrorize the rebels and the civilian populace sheltering them. Two rebel-held districts—Eastern Ghouta and Western Ghouta—were struck in the early hours of the morning with rockets containing sarin, dispersing a heavy, colorless gas that sank into the basements where civilians had taken shelter from conventional shelling.

Victims exhibited classic symptoms of sarin poisoning—convulsions, pinpoint pupils, frothing at the mouth, respiratory distress, and, in many cases, death within minutes of exposure, with over 355 deaths recorded within hours. The chemical strike, killing thousands, was immediately attributed to the Syrian government by Western powers. The Assad regime, however, denied culpability, and its Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov alleged the attack was a rebel-orchestrated false flag operation. For Obama, the assault posed a geopolitical and moral quandary. Obama, having declared the use of chemical weapons a “red line,” opted against military action in favor of a U.S.-Russian deal for Syria to surrender its chemical stockpile. Western resolve was shown to be weary when, in Westminster, Prime Minister David Cameron was humiliated by a parliamentary vote rejecting intervention, opting to shift Britain’s focus to humanitarian aid, exposing the frailty of Western resolve, which proved to be a boon for jihadist factions like ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra to take advantage.

Concurrently, the Kurdish minority in northern Syria, primarily represented by the People's Protection Units (YPG), seized the opportunity to establish a state. Their effective resistance against ISIS garnered them support from the United States and its allies, with the Kurds proving to be a pivotal force in stabilizing the region. However, this alliance was fraught with geopolitical tensions, particularly with NATO ally Turkey, which views the YPG as an extension of the PKK, a designated terrorist organization. Eventually, President Donald Trump withdrew American troops from northern Syria in 2019, an action that was perceived as a betrayal by the Kurdish forces and left them vulnerable to Turkish military incursions and ISIS remnants.

Vladimir Putin eventually opted to reassert Moscow's influence in the Middle East, beginning in 2015 when he deployed air and ground forces to Syria with the public intention of mounting a campaign against ISIS and Islamist terrorism. However, the operation quickly revealed its true purpose: the stabilization of Assad's rule, the re-establishment of Russia as a geopolitical power broker, and merely taking advantage of the void left by Obama's indecision. Russian airstrikes targeted opposition-held areas indiscriminately, striking not only at jihadist factions but at moderate rebels and civilian infrastructure. Russia began deploying its ground soldiers and embedding Russian advisors within the Syrian military, with Putin positioning Russia as a staunch ally to beleaguered regimes and a guarantor of regional stability, no matter the cost to human lives. Conveniently, it also allowed Putin to secure the Russian naval base of Tartus and the newly built Khmeimim Air Base, cementing a strategic foothold for Moscow in the Mediterranean.

Alongside Russia, Iran opted to intervene to preserve the Assad regime—a linchpin in its "Axis of Resistance." The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), under the aegis of the Quds Force, orchestrated the deployment of military advisors, intelligence operatives, and elite combat units to Syria, collaborating with the Russians. This initiative was spearheaded by Major General Qasem Soleimani, whose presence on the front lines underscored Iran's dedication to Assad's survival. Soleimani's strategic prowess was instrumental in pivotal operations, notably the recapture of Aleppo by the 3-nation armies of Syria, Russia, and Iran in 2016, which marked a turning point in the regime's favor.

Complementing its direct military involvement, Iran mobilized a constellation of Shia militias from across the region and utilized their proxy, Lebanese Hezbollah, which became a formidable force on Syrian battlefields. Concurrently, Iran recruited and deployed units such as the Afghan Liwa Fatemiyoun and the Iraqi Harakat al-Nujaba, weaving a tapestry of proxy forces that bolstered Assad's beleaguered army—while simultaneously allowing Iran to project itself as a regional power capable of exerting its influence abroad, helping to alleviate hardline factions in Tehran. Iran's deepening involvement in Syria exacerbated sectarian tensions, fueling Sunni resentment and contributing to the radicalization that groups like ISIS exploited. By this point, the war had evolved less from a “fight for freedom” and more toward a prolonged, protracted, and incredibly deadly Sunni-Shia civil war.

Last week, the stalemate was broken, as Syrian rebels, led by the jihadist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), formerly Jabhat al-Nusra (the al-Qaeda affiliate), launched an offensive last week that saw them retake the city of Aleppo in less than four days after years of impasse, a consequence from the March 2020 Idlib ceasefire. Hezbollah and Shia militias had redeployed from Syria in an attempt to repel the Israeli ground invasion in Lebanon; however, with the humiliating defeat inflicted by Israel, including a special operation that resulted in thousands of Hezbollah pagers exploding on their owners, Hezbollah and the rest of the Axis, have been incredibly weakened. Russia’s focus has turned away from Syria and toward their failed invasion of Ukraine, which has siphoned much of Moscow’s time and military resources—all while anti-Assad jihadist rebels have had four years to prepare for revolt.

It’s a manifestation of the absolute failure of the U.S. approach to Syria, which I feel compelled to note does not imply excusing Assad’s regime. His government has committed heinous crimes, from indiscriminate barrel bombings to chemical attacks on civilians. It’s extremely unlikely that Syria’s future would be prosperous with Assad at the helm, but it is equally foolish to believe that his ouster is the be all end all solution to Syria’s woes, for this thinking ignores the complexities of a radical opposition and seemed willing to overlook the fact that the Arab governments that may have once called for his removal are now the same parties in negotiations with him presently. The fact is that only Assad has protected the minority Christians, Yazidis, and others while the Islamist groups have often enslaved, raped, tortured, and executed them—it doesn’t take an intellectual to understand that these groups are safer under Assad’s secular dictatorship than a group that is, quite literally, tied to al-Qaeda.

Should HTS and the rebels take over Syria, they will proclaim their caliphate and invoke a hardline approach to Sharia law; ethnic and religious minorities will be murdered in a brutal genocide, much like what happened to Christians when the Islamic State took over the power vacuum. It will create a mass humanitarian crisis as they attempt to flee—the Alawite and Shia face a particularly heightened threat of retaliation from the opposition groups. HTS will then turn its attention to its rival, ISIS, in the East; the potential for this battle reminds me of Kissinger’s prophetic foreign policy: “It’s a pity they both can’t lose.” The collapse of Assad’s regime would invoke celebrations in Washington until it becomes quite obvious that HTS will “breach containment” and that the resurrection of the Islamic State could invite a similar uprising again in Iraq—thus necessitating, once again, intervention and leading to a loss of thousands of lives needlessly.

One wonders if this entire situation was avoidable; a pragmatic approach might have involved engaging Assad indirectly, using his desire for survival as leverage to broker a broader settlement. Assad has cooperated with the West in the past, until the 2010s the West seemed willing to accept the legitimacy of his brutal dictatorship, and his views are more nuanced than the surface level would believe, following the September 11 attacks, Syria emerged as a vital intelligence partner for the CIA in the fight against al-Qaeda, providing unexpectedly valuable information and hosting key operations in the U.S.-led extraordinary rendition program, with “the quality and quantity of information from Syria [having] exceeded the Agency’s expectations.1” When then British Prime Minister Tony Blair visited Damascus, British officials observed a more measured tone in private, with Assad expressing horror at and criticizing the September 11 attacks and tacitly recognizing Israel's legitimacy.

The Biden administration seems willing to undergo this unsavory, yet necessary negotiation—though this comes after, rather than serving to prevent, his killing hundreds of thousands, his brutal chemical attacks, and other heinous atrocities. Over the weekend, it was reported that American and Emirati officials discussed lifting sanctions on Assad’s regime in exchange for a break with Iran—a counter from Obama’s foolish unwillingness to negotiate any deal, which forced Assad to turn to alternative allies and perpetuated the civil war.

It’s a reminder of the need for realism in foreign policy—not all outcomes align neatly with democratic ideals, particularly in the Middle East. If the Western foreign policy establishment hasn’t figured this out after all that has transpired, then they have utterly failed to learn the lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan. For while Syria’s fate is unknown, and the future of Assad’s regime is likely to be determined by the end of this week or the next, a Western policy driven by idealism, ignorance of history, and untethered to ground realities has exacerbated suffering, destabilized the region, allowed Assad to commit atrocities and kill hundreds of thousands, and tarnished America’s reputation as a reliable partner. As always, it seems in this region, no party will emerge truly victorious, and the losers of the conflict will be the innocents set for persecution whose voices are often unrepresented and fall on deaf ears.

I had been waiting patiently over the last few weeks to collect myself in the aftermath of the election results and wait for enough of President-elect Donald Trump’s cabinet nominations to begin trickling in. (It is strange to use that title for a second time in a row; this hasn’t occurred in 132 years). Of course, in typical Trumpian fashion, some picks are good—a testament to his aytpical, though not infrequent, moments of sheer brilliance; some are bad, lacking the expected caliber required for the Federal government; and a few are outright ugly—in the political sense.

Beginning with the most important nomination the president presents to the United States Senate—Senator Marco Rubio for Secretary of State—I commend Mr. Trump for what is, without question, the greatest nomination to that post in the last 42 years. Mr. Rubio has been one of the most proactive advocates for a hawkish “peace through strength” foreign policy doctrine and one of the Senate’s greatest champions of American national interests.

Mr. Rubio's nomination comes as a welcome relief for our partners in the Middle East, particularly given his replacement of Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who disgracefully blackmailed Israel on top of his cowardly conduct of appeasement that has enabled Iranian aggression in the region. Mr. Rubio has been a consistent hawk on Iran, warning back during the Obama administration’s nuclear deal appeasement how Iran is “led by a Supreme Leader who is a radical Shia cleric with an apocalyptic vision of the future. He is not a traditional geopolitical actor who makes decisions based on borders...he has a religious apocalyptic vision of the future.”

Such common sense, that being that one cannot negotiate with Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who is an unhinged lunatic seeking to bring about the end times and the destruction of the United States, the House of Saud, and the State of Israel, is lost on our present so-called foreign policy elite.

Mr. Rubio will goad Mr. Trump into the correct direction on Russia—a policy of strength and of the United States being proactive rather than merely reactive, like under Biden—with the implementation of sanctions and an increased amount of lethal aid to Ukraine. He will, ideally, help Mr. Trump remember to be wary of the charms and false promises of Vladimir Putin, whom Mr. Rubio has always described as a criminal adversary no better than a thuggish gangster during his inevitable negotiation of a peace settlement with Ukraine.

Israel will no longer face unjust and arbitrary pressures from the United States, and support will not be conditioned on adhering to the whims of Hamas. Instead, it will be met with unwavering support from a State Department that will restore U.S. dominance on the world stage and confront adversaries with uncompromising resolve. Mr. Rubio will also restore much-needed credibility in the United States' conduct towards Nicolás Maduro and unwind our failed policy, that I have previously critiqued, and reimplement sanctions to bring that brute to heel.

Mr. Rubio is a phenomenal choice for Secretary of State, and he and the rest of Mr. Trump’s foreign policy team will be equally well served by Mike Waltz's nomination as National Security advisor. Mr. Waltz is one of the House’s most hawkish voices, particularly on China; formerly a Green Beret and Pentagon official, Mr. Waltz has called for “a new Monroe Doctrine” to block Chinese economic and military influence in the Americas, warning of “a clear and present threat to our country given the sophistication of the CCP's espionage operations.”

Mr. Waltz has raised awareness of the dangers of our dependence on Chinese resources, particularly relating to our national defense, citing that “South America offers a wide array of critical minerals” vital to U.S. strategic interests—he and Mr. Rubio would do well to negotiate an agreement with several of these nations on behalf of the Trump White House. Mr.Waltz has been a strong proponent of arming Ukraine, confronting Iranian proxies in the Middle East, and countering the growing alliance between Russia and North Korea—another exceptional pick by the president-elect.

Mr. Trump has several additional strong picks. Doug Burgum, who I erroneously predicted would be Mr. Trump’s Vice President, at the Interior Department will excel. Lee Zeldin, a relatively moderate former representative from Long Island, will do a brilliant job heading the EPA, and John Ratcliffe will do the same at the CIA. Chris Wright brings much-needed private sector expertise to the Department of Energy. One looks on with near admiration at these choices—stellar choices, choices that cynics would have expected of a Republican administration, but ones that the public as a whole could look at with confidence. This assumption, however, is predicated on the condition that one ignores Mr. Trump’s more controversial picks.

Mr. Trump ran on a promise to shake up Washington, to “drain the swamp,” and to utterly disrupt the status quo. In doing so, he achieved the largest Republican victory since 1988—therefore departures from traditional orthodoxies are expected, in some cases were demanded by the public, but that does not necessarily excuse, nor should it encourage, the confirmation of some of his choices. The grumblings began when he announced his pick for Secretary of Defense, FOX News host and former director of Vets For Freedom, Pete Hegseth. He is an unorthodox pick with an atypical resume for a Secretary of Defense, though many attacks against his nomination and himself are unfounded and disgraceful.

The View host Whoopi Goldberg insinuated that Mr. Hegseth, a twenty-year Army veteran with two Bronze Star medals who saw combat in deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, “clearly does not know anything about the military” and mocked him for being a weekend host rather than the full-time host of FOX and Friends. Senator Elizabeth Warren bizarrely chimed in, “All three of my brothers served in uniform. I respect every one of our servicemembers,” adding that “Donald Trump’s pick will make us less safe and must be rejected,” without ever elaborating on how Mr. Hegseth poses a risk to national security.

Now, there are legitimate concerns about Mr. Hegseth’s nomination—namely, his lack of managerial experience. In 2024, the Department of Defense had $1.99 trillion distributed among its six sub-components—a budget equivalent to the entire GDP of Russia. Overseeing it is a huge responsibility, but these pressures can be alleviated by nominating competent deputies, perhaps returnees familiar with the department's bureaucracy, who can lend a hand in that regard. I maintain that the benefits of Mr. Hegseth’s nomination outweigh the cons of his inexperience.

Mr. Hegseth has a demonstrated reverence for the military and a manifest desire to work toward reforming an institution that has faced severe challenges to its reputation and credibility over the past few years—an erosion of confidence following its disgraceful and humiliating exit from Afghanistan in 2021, dismal recruiting numbers, and an atrocious leader in Lloyd Austin, who kept the President of the United States, Joe Biden, in the dark for three days that he was hospitalized. Someone should inform Mrs. Warren that the pick who “makes us less safe” is the present occupant of the office, who went A.W.O.L. while American servicemen were actively in harm’s way, fighting against drone and missile attacks in the Middle East.

Mr. Hegseth knows the military and is the type of candidate prime for reform and returning it to its apex as the undisputed number-one fighting force on the planet. Having a Secretary of Defense who has fought in modern combat and served in our most recent wars—not as a General in headquarters but as a boots-on-the-ground infantryman—will lend a unique insight and a severe amount of credibility to modern warfare. Mr. Hegseth is a strong hawk on Iran, containing the influence of China, and supporting Ukraine in their fight for preservation against Russia—stances he will no doubt elaborate on during his Senate confirmation hearing, where he is likely to excel. Charles Cooke’s excellent defence of Mr. Hegseth summarizes the hidden brilliances of the pick

Similar sentiments of confidence cannot be expressed about Tulsi Gabbard, the formerly staunch progressive Democrat who conveniently reappeared into the political scene as a “born-again” Republican, who has been selected as Mr. Trump’s pick for Director of National Intelligence. Mrs. Gabbard is an odd choice for a plethora of reasons, the kindest being that she is simply at odds with the worldview of the rest of Mr. Trump’s administration, and the harshest being that her nomination and potential confirmation could be damaging to our national security given her foreign policy views.

Before elaborating further, I would note that the following critiques of Mrs. Gabbard’s worldview and previous comments are not to call into question her patriotism nor accuse her of treason. This is a woman who has risked her life on behalf of the United States and continues to do so as a Lieutenant Colonel in the Army Reserve. Such service is to be commended and appreciated but does not deter criticism.

Mrs. Gabbard has expressed a series of concerning foreign policy views over the years, beginning in her tenure in Congress, where she decided to journey to Syria unilaterally, meet with Syrian dictatorial President Bashar al-Assad, and, months later, voiced doubts that Mr. Assad authorized the use of chemical weapons against the people of Khan Shaykhun—a view shared by the Syrian and Russian governments and contradicted by those of the United States, European Union, and the United Kingdom, whose representative to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Sir Geoffrey Adams, noted that:

Evidence of the Syrian government’s involvement was so strong and damning that Mr. Trump launched a retaliatory strike against the Sharyat Airbase, where U.S. intelligence believed the attack was launched from. This strike destroyed 20 percent of the Syrian Air Force and negated their ability to launch further attacks—a decision justified by Mr. Trump as being in “the vital national security interest of the United States to prevent and deter the spread and use of deadly chemical weapons.” Mrs. Gabbard criticized this decision as “short-sighted” and potentially prompting “nuclear war between the United States and Russia.”

Mrs. Gabbard additionally criticized Mr. Trump for his assassination of IRGC terrorist Qassem Soleimani, saying that it had “no justification whatsoever” and posing the question, “Is our country’s national security better off because of Donald Trump’s actions and decision? And the answer to that is no.”

Most concerning are her views on Russia and its military actions in Ukraine—opinions that have led to some outright labeling her as a Russian asset. This charge was bolstered by an accusation from Hillary Clinton during the 2020 Democratic primaries, in which Mrs. Gabbard was a candidate, that the Russians were bankrolling one of the candidates. Upon Russia’s full-scale invasion of mainland Ukraine in February 2022, Mrs. Gabbard posted a bizarre message on X, stating that Presidents Zelensky and Biden needed to work with Mr. Putin to embrace “the spirit of aloha” by agreeing that Ukraine would remain a neutral nation—and never join NATO—before elaborating that Russia's “legitimate security concerns” stem from NATO expansion. I would allege that this is a Kremlin talking point—but even the Kremlin would disagree with such absurdity! Tucker Carlson did hawks everywhere a great service in his interview with Mr. Putin, for even Mr. Putin refused to cite NATO expansionism as his reason for invading Ukraine. Instead, he explained that he took it simply because he believes it belongs to Russia, per borders from 700 A.D., and that he does not recognize their right to self-determination.

Lastly, pertaining to the Pacific, Mrs. Gabbard voiced another outlandish view on the military buildup of Japan, an important national security partner and close ally of the United States. She warned that “We remember Japan's aggression in the Pacific; we need to ask ourselves this question: is the remilitarization of Japan, which is presently underway, truly a good idea? We need to be careful that shortsighted, self-serving leaders do not end up bringing us again face-to-face with a remilitarized Japan.” Bluntly speaking, as it pertains to the Pacific theater, I have never come across such a witless foreign policy viewpoint in my life. While her attitudes toward appeasing dictators echo the failures of the 1930s, they do not justify drawing parallels between modern Japan and its actions during that era.

If confirmed as head of DNI, Mrs. Gabbard’s attitudes toward the United States and her seeming ambivalence toward the threat of China, Russia, and Iran are dangerous and would weaken America’s security. Mrs. Gabbard’s confirmation would offer nothing but a plethora of bad ideas, delivered with a misplaced sense of self-righteousness, disgusting false equivalencies between the U.S. and Putin, and vapid “feel-good” opinions on foreign policy and war. Her track record and judgment—or lack thereof—on foreign policy is atrocious and would seriously damage the credibility of our intelligence community.

The DNI coordinates with foreign intelligence services to integrate and analyze data. Even if Mrs. Gabbard miraculously gets confirmed by the Senate, how many foreign allies are going to feel comfortable sharing intelligence with the U.S. if they even suspect it will end up in her hands? Furthermore, the DNI prepares the President's Daily Brief. It is irrefutable that Mrs. Gabbard would elevate or diminish particular threats in her communications to the president, likely raising nonsensical concerns about Japan, an ally, while diminishing the threats and motivations of Russia, China, and Iran.

But while Mrs. Gabbard’s nomination is offensive on the basis of her policy, Mr. Trump also felt it prudent, oddly enough, to nominate the man most worthy of bipartisan contempt and scorn to the office of Attorney General—that being Matt Gaetz. There is the conventional theory of “Trump playing 4-D chess,” the idea being that Mr. Gaetz’s nomination is designed for failure, to rid the House of his antics—while providing him immunity from a scathing ethics investigation—and to lay the groundwork for a more acceptable MAGA candidate later on. If it is not, then Mr. Gaetz will be shot down by the Senate upon arrival, as he should be.

His qualifications for the position are non-existent. The man practiced law for less than 1,000 days at a small firm in Northern Florida. He is an agent of chaos, legislatively incompetent, most notable for a coup against House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, and being a man devoid of principle, integrity, honor, or wit.

The ethics investigation suggests that he is a statutory rapist—a source of pride for him, it seems, as Mr. Gaetz bragged to his colleagues about his sexual conquests, showing other Republican congressmen nude photos of them, much to their discomfort, and boasting about how he mixed energy drinks with ED medication so he could “go all night.” In testimony to the House Ethics Committee, two women—one of whom was 17 years old at the time—reported how Mr. Gaetz paid them for sex. Mr. McCarthy revealed that Mr. Gaetz’s true motive in ousting him as speaker was his refusal to cull the ethics investigation into him. Mr. McCarthy added, “A lot of people have concerns about him. And I’m not sure if he’s on something, but I do hope he gets the help that he needs. But more importantly, I hope the young women get the justice they deserve when it comes to him.” Hardly words of praise from a man who would know him best.

Matt Gaetz is so manifestly unqualified, so morally bankrupt, so glaringly absurd as a nominee for Attorney General, that even entertaining his credibility is an act of political malpractice and a denigration of the credibility of the United States. His confirmation, unlikely as it may be, would signify not just a loss of Republican resolve but a wholesale abdication of their constitutional responsibility to the nation. In no world should a legal amateur—and potential statutory rapist—be elevated to the highest law enforcement position in the land. Mr. Trump should err on the side of caution given his threats to gamble with constitutional norms by attempting to adjourn Congress to ram through this preposterous appointment. He will not only fracture his own party, but expending political capital on such an indefensible nominee would sully his administration unnecessarily.

Many have offered analyses of Donald Trump’s historic victory, and over the coming months, you’ll no doubt read countless perspectives. But after a sleepless night, I felt compelled to provide a straightforward audit of the election and examine where each party might go from here. Firstly, Mr. Trump, now President-elect Donald Trump, is the second man in history to be elected to two nonconsecutive terms besides fellow New Yorker Grover Cleveland (I’m sure many historians are devastated that this unique distinction has grown more common). And, unlike his fluke victory in 2016 or his narrow defeat in 2020, Mr. Trump is on track to win the popular vote, the first time for a Republican since 2004. He is set to win 312 electoral votes, the most for a Republican since 1988; he has achieved the best Republican performance with non-White voters since 1960. This is the story of the most remarkable comeback in American politics, surpassing Richard Nixon in 1968, and there are many takeaways.

The biggest surprise of the night was not Mr. Trump’s performance in the swing states but his inroads with moderates, Hispanic, African-American, Asian, and Jewish voters—who may not have made a difference in the more white, rural swing states of the rust belt, but allowed him to “ride the wave” nationally. Blue states like New York went from voting 23 points Democratic to just 10 points. New Jersey went from voting 16 points for Mr. Biden to being carried by Kamala Harris by a weak margin of 4.9 points. Connecticut shifted 8 points to the right, with Mr. Trump narrowly losing it by 12 points. Mr. Trump only lost Illinois with 45.2 percent to Ms. Harris's 53.4 percent, a margin of 8.2, a decrease from Mr. Biden's 17-point victory four years prior. I wrote that in 2016, with Mr. Trump narrowly winning through pluralities in states and razor-tight margins, his victory was a fluke—but 2024 has proven to be no fluke and a major realignment in American politics. Moderates and a multiracial coalition propelled Mr. Trump’s “MAGA” movement to victory and have given him a resounding mandate, manifesting a plea to enact change—irrespective of voter’s personal opinions on him, his conduct post-2020 election, his indictments, it is abundantly clear that Mr. Trump has been chosen, resoundingly, by the public to govern.

My most controversial claim I will allege is that Mr.Trump has been more consequential for the Republican party than Ronald Reagan ever was and, if anything, bears more similarity to Franklin D. Roosevelt—I have alleged, in the past, that Mr. Trump is not coherent and articulate enough on policy specifics to forge a “permanent revolution” that would result in his populist agenda supplanting traditional conservative orthodoxy, which may indeed prove true, but he, by the sheer force of his political genius and willpower, has transformed the Republican Party into a one-man vessel over a decade-long period and three presidential elections, in the mold of FDR in the 1930s-1940s.

It was FDR who brought African-Americans into the Democratic party in his 1932 victory and was the first Democratic candidate to flip significant cities like Philadelphia, Chicago, and Baltimore—and while Mr. Trump did not flip these, his strong performance with non-White voters, specifically Hispanics, suggests that, like FDR, he has expanded the party’s traditional coalition and forged “MAGA” into something of a modern “New Deal” coalition; I would not be surprised if Hispanics emerge by 2028 as a reliable Republican party constituency. And with such strong allies in Congress, a comfortable Senate majority, and likely retention of the House, I expect Mr. Trump’s first 100 days to look like Roosevelt’s 100 days—Mr. Roosevelt’s influence was so grand that for a significant amount of New Deal legislation, Democrats (who had supermajorities) would look at a bill, inquire whether it was “from the boss,” and pass it unanimously without even reading it.

The electoral destruction of the Democrats that, as I wrote above, incredibly manifested in the bluest of states shows that it was an advantageous macro environment for the Republican party that propelled Mr. Trump to victory. I considered elaborating on the failings of Kamala Harris's candidacy, but I feel that it is best served as a separate editorial and that she was not much of a candidate; she didn’t present herself as different from Mr. Biden. Ms. Harris offered very little to the average voter in terms of policy; what she did offer were left-wing Peronist politics such as price controls to tackle “price gouging,” an inflationary $25,000 credit for first-time homebuyers, and an “unrealized gains tax” on capital gains—left-wing policies when the country was crying for a divergence from the present administration. On that front, Ms. Harris could not list any decision she would have undertaken differently from the unpopular President Joe Biden. Thus, most voters felt they had no alternative but Mr. Trump.

If anything, this should come as a relief for her; the reality is that no Democratic nominee likely could have overcome this storm and that, if anything, the only thing preventing an electoral annihilation in the mold of Reagan's 1980 victory was Mr. Trump’s consistently weak performance with highly educated affluent White voters that prevented him from carrying Virginia, Colorado, and New Hampshire. The failings and off-putting policies of the Biden administration in the retreat from Afghanistan, a failure to deter Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, a belligerent Iran that lays siege to Israel through its proxies, unconstitutional executive orders to buy votes with student-loan relief, ten million illegal migrants crossing the border, a stagnant economy where wages have not outpaced the increase in prices of four years, the de-facto legalization of crime in major blue cities as a result of a “woke” approach to criminal justice, unpopular DEI initiatives have relegated identity politics and leftist ideology to the backseat; or potentially the ash-heap of history.

For all of Ms. Harris's talk of upholding freedom, her slogan, “We’re Not Going Back,” was anything but accurate; the progressivism that came to define the Democratic party of the Obama and Biden years and much of the establishment culture and media has been crushed. Her party’s shift to being more “progressive” than liberal—more committed to socially engineering “progress”—has resulted in its electoral annihilation. It’s the culmination of the failings of the Democrats’ shift away from classical liberalism, where guaranteeing personal liberty is the prerogative of the state, in favor of a revisionist history-based left-wing ideology of progressivism, where all racial and economic disparities are the result of systemic racism, and uprooting all institutions, for being discriminatory has to be achieved, and all other considerations secondary.

The Democratic coalition has been shattered; aside from unmarried women and the uber-wealthy, the Democrats have no other base to draw upon, and their electoral prospects will collapse permanently if things continue as is. Their support has collapsed among men, married couples and parents, the middle class (that was the backbone of their party), and non-White voters—the last of which poses an existential threat to the Democratic party, for the non-White population is expected to compose the majority of the United States population by 2050. Time will tell if the Democrats learn the correct lesson from this election, which is a need to tack to the center à la Bill Clinton in 1992, after Michael Dukakis's resounding defeat in 1988, and run a candidate like Governors Josh Shapiro or Wes Moore, or if they will double down on progressivism and opt for candidates like Gretchen Whitmer and Gavin Newsom, who would likely lose to future Vice President J.D. Vance.

There isn’t much to be said about Donald Trump that I haven’t already. He brought unprecedented baggage to the race; his conduct after the 2020 election and repeated election denial seemed impossible to overcome. His erratic behavior and frequently questionable policy positions raised legitimate concerns that I and many others had about his suitability for a return to office, and the “lawfare,” as his supporters call it, that Democratic prosecutors saddled him with proved to be an electoral strength. Personal opinions aside, one has to credit the man's resilience against adversity in mounting a comeback that manifested in the largest Republican victory since George H.W. Bush 36 years ago.

While I remained ambivalent in predicting the outcome of the election, I wrote repeatedly over the last year and a half that Mr. Biden (and by extension Ms. Harris) was quite beatable due to lackluster polling numbers and an amidst revival in small-government conservatism, encouraged by the successful governorships of Ron DeSantis, Brian Kemp, Glenn Youngkin, Kim Reynolds, and Greg Abbott—particularly in response to the Biden administration’s COVID policies in 2021. While Mr. Trump deserves a unique amount of credit for his resilience and the raw display of courage in the face of two dastardly assassination attempts, and the strength of an unorthodox campaign that brought out a multi-racial coalition of low propensity groups and relied on alternative media such as podcasts, I do not necessarily believe that the public has fully embraced all aspects of Mr. Trump and Trumpism.

I, as do most Americans, remain a conservative—a classical liberal who believes in upholding the foundations that made America great—free speech, free markets, faith, individualism, and never giving into the tyranny of authoritarianism at home and abroad. And even though Mr. Trump's historic victory seems like a capitulation towards Vox Populi, the truth is that Americans will not tolerate him conducting himself as a loud-mouth and vulgar demagogue, and if that is the route he goes down, he can expect to be punished at the ballot box in 2026. I believe Americans have entrusted him to set forth on the business of governance and bring a sense of normalcy, the one they demanded of Mr. Biden in 2020, that being the pre-COVID Trump administration of 2019 and before, and to get a sluggish economy back on the treadmill.

The conspiratorial nature of many on the right becomes increasingly pathetic and laughable in the context of tonight, as we are somehow to believe Democrats supposedly stole the election from a sitting president with full control of the executive branch. Still, in 2024, with even more motivation and power, the shadowy and sinister deep state decided to let Trump win? Where was George Soros when they needed him? And in the bluest of cities, where allegedly the fraud is so grand, he overperformed his previous margins by double digits? It defies logic to suggest that Democrats would steal one election but not the other, raising questions about the consistency of the fraud narrative. Could it be that it was a lie meant to conceal a bruised ego? Worthy of pondering, indeed.

The biggest takeaway of the election is that Democrats misunderstood that the pitch wasn’t the problem; the product was. Democrats foolishly decided against having a competitive primary season. When Mr. Biden was forced out by his party, they naïvely believed Ms. Harris could laugh and clap her way through the so-called “brat summer” to the White House without diverging from Mr. Biden’s policy in any way. With all the emphasis on the “adults being back in charge” in the aftermath of Mr. Biden’s victory four years prior, it’s incredible how, as incumbents, Democrats still tried to position themselves as change agents, though Ms. Harris couldn’t point to a single action she would have handled differently than the Biden administration. The American people, ultimately, opted for actual change.

I have numerous reservations about Mr. Trump, my opinion, and previous criticisms, and I stand by my editorial criticism of him. I am astutely aware that many readers are split on their feelings about this outcome. Still, I wish President-elect Trump and Vice President-elect J.D. Vance the best wishes and encourage us all to pray for their success and the country, for they embark on a mission to unite a country after a bitter campaign that has left us on edge, but not fractured. Thanks to a few strong shots of espresso, I remained awake long enough to watch Mr. Trump’s victory speech—and I was encouraged by what I heard, with Mr. Trump oddly enough humble in victory and preaching the importance of bringing the country together. I will praise his successes and criticize bad policy and conduct wherever I find it, but I believe that all of us, irrespective of who we voted for, have nothing to feel but optimism about our future.

Regarding that, I would point to 2004, wherein conceding the election, Senator John Kerry correctly observed that: “In an American election, there are no losers, because whether or not our candidates are successful, the next morning we all wake up as Americans. And that -- that is the greatest privilege and the most remarkable good fortune that can come to us on earth.” These are important words to remember, now more than ever. Irrespective of who one may have voted for, I am proud to see Americans turning out, in record numbers in many places, to express their voices—the backbone of our Republic is an engaged and informed citizenry. Utilizing their right to vote is the most consequential action the average individual exercises in his or her life. I tip my hat to all of my fellow citizens for understanding the importance of this responsibility and expressing their voices.

Take a few minutes to read Jeff Bezos’s op-ed in the Washington Post. Mr. Bezos, who owns the paper, comes across as balanced and self-reflective. He addresses a critical issue that extends beyond the media to affect the very fabric of the Western world: the rapid erosion of public trust. As he writes, “Our profession is now the least trusted of all. Something we are doing is clearly not working.” This insight led to Mr. Bezos’s decision to end political endorsements at the Post, a small yet meaningful step toward restoring credibility.

Many, particularly on the right, celebrate the mainstream media’s loss of credibility—yet this response is ultimately self-destructive. It’s easy to criticize the media for its mistakes, but any serious critique must ask: compared to what? And what would become of an informed society if we abandoned the press for other, less reliable sources? Mr. Bezos draws an insightful analogy: just as voting machines must both “count the vote accurately” and be trusted to count accurately, “we must be accurate, and we must be believed to be accurate.”

Trust, he argues, is as fundamental as truth itself. This credibility—the public’s faith in journalism—underpins any institution’s authority to shape public debate. Yet, too many would rather reduce the media to a polarized echo chamber—MSNBC for liberals, Fox News for conservatives—than engage in genuine reform. Keep it as is. I believe that this apathy and our present status quo would inaugurate the death of our Republic, and we need not accept this reality; constructive criticism and dedicated engagement can restore the American media’s reputation—a reputation that, when balanced against its detractors, deserves preservation.

Now, the mainstream media did make a series of high-profile errors, and it’s easy to list these—Russiagate, the dangers of COVID, the merit of lockdowns, and the authenticity of Hunter Biden's laptop—without recognizing that, as an institution, the media has performed far better than its alternatives. Despite these errors, traditional media operates with a structured approach to accountability and factual integrity—qualities rare among its freewheeling competitors. Richard Hanania made this very case in a compelling defense published early last year. His argument remains one of the most convincing, well-articulated cases for the American media’s survival.

Social media platforms and influencer-driven news sources claim to reveal the “real” truth, often without corroboration or editorial standards. Unchecked misinformation can have stark consequences. We saw this in the 2020 election cycle when an alternative media ecosystem fueled conspiracies around election fraud, fracturing public trust in the democratic process. By 2023, an estimated 70% of right-leaning Americans believed in the illegitimacy of Joe Biden’s victory.1

To understand the path forward, we must acknowledge the dual responsibility that lies with both the media and the public it serves and the importance of separating reporting from opinion. For the press, this means re-evaluating the conventions that create bias, as Mr. Bezos argued candidate endorsements did. Ending them is a move he called “a principled decision, and… the right one.” He elaborates: “Presidential endorsements…create a perception of bias…a perception of non-independence.” Removing this practice from the capital’s most trusted paper of record reflects the Washington Post’s shift from opinionated partisanship to impartial, rigorous journalism that seeks to inform rather than persuade.

One idea that could build on this shift is for the Post editors to list the policy planks of the Republican and Democratic candidates, side by side, so that readers are given a case for both, thus arriving at their own conclusion. In covering presidential elections, it is far more important to offer objective information rather than opinion so that readers are empowered to make informed decisions. It’s a concept that may come to fruition as Mr. Bezos, per reporting by the New York Post, has given the paper a mandate to hire conservative opinion columnists—another welcome development and one that will enrich the quality of the paper ten-fold.

I won’t conflate the importance of this newsletter, whose audience, importance, and quality of reporting is, bluntly, pitiful in comparison to the Washington Post, but I’ve striven to maintain transparency regarding my conservative perspective. Rightwise has always prioritized accuracy, disclosed its bias, and encouraged contributions from opposing viewpoints to avoid a pure echo chamber. The fact that the majority of readers who engage with my content hail from the opposite end of the political spectrum reinforces my mission of constructive discourse.

Abandoning mainstream media in favor of alternatives would endanger the informed society on which our way of life depends. When we read a story in The New York Times or the Washington Post, we’re engaging with institutions that, despite flaws, possess the capacity for correction, accountability, and adaptation. The media’s future depends not on its critics but on a public willing to demand high standards while recognizing the vital role it plays. As Mr. Bezos put it, “The stakes are too high.” Now more than ever, we need a “credible, trusted, independent voice” that remains a cornerstone of democratic life, ensuring public trust and accurate information as a bedrock of an informed society.

Kamala Harris’ campaign is faltering with male voters—particularly young, Black, and Hispanic men. Recent polling reveals that only 49 percent of Black men under 50 support her and 25 percent of young Black men are backing her Republican opponent, Donald Trump. One finds a significant gender gap among Black voters, as two-thirds of Black women support Harris, but her appeal to men is far weaker. Hispanic men also show lower support; in Arizona, 51 percent of Hispanic men aged 18-34 support Mr. Trump, compared to just 39 percent for Ms. Harris. Among those aged 35-49, Mr. Trump holds an even larger lead, with 57 percent backing him and only 37 percent supporting Ms. Harris. A similarly dismal trend bodes for her in Nevada, where 53 percent of younger Hispanic men plan to vote for Mr. Trump, compared to 40 percent for Ms. Harris.

Men, as a whole, seem inclined against Ms. Harris’ candidacy, per the most recent AtlasIntel poll, which found Mr. Trump leading Ms. Harris nationally 50-48; roughly 49 percent of men said they reject Ms. Harris more. A recent article by the New York Times revealed that young men back Mr. Trump 58-37 over Ms. Harris. Democrats have moved quickly to dismiss the support of men, particularly young Black and Hispanic men, for Mr. Trump to sexist attitudes. Indeed, for many Democrats, the narrative of the sinister patriarchy strikes again!

Democratic strategist Christy Setzer would have us believe that Ms.Harris faces a familiar foe: the same “misogyny” and “outdated ideas on who should hold the presidency” that supposedly thwarted Hillary Clinton. Ms. Setzer claimed that Mr. Trump exploits a “strongman” image at his rallies that is tailor-made to resonate with male voters who, in her view, are too disillusioned with Ms. Harris’ leadership to recognize a good thing when they see it. With his talent for grandstanding and belittling those of differing political opinions, even Barack Obama could not resist weighing in. Mr. Obama criticized “the brothers” for their lukewarm response to Ms. Harris—daring to suggest that perhaps their reluctance isn’t about the policy shifts or any substantive grievances with the Democratic Party but is, of course, rooted in something far more nefarious: sexism and discomfort with the notion of a female president. Naturally, the possibility that young men might have valid concerns about Kamala Harris’ leadership doesn’t even cross the Democratic mind.

Mr. Trump has made a precise play for the male vote, recently appearing on podcasts like Theo Von's, Lex Fridman's, and Andrew Schulz’s, with an appearance on The Joe Rogan Experience, the most listened-to podcast on Spotify, planned. His strategy? To solidify his appeal among young men by speaking their language—authentic, unapologetic, and bold. I’ve written before about how this kind of no-prisoners rhetoric screams leadership to younger men, who are starved for anything that doesn’t sound like a focus group or human resources churned it out. Contrast that with Ms. Harris’ approach—carefully scripted and predictably uninspiring. Her campaign’s solution to this problem? Deploying her running mate and the left’s idea of a “guy’s guy,” Tim Walz, on a cringe-worthy “dudes-rock tour,” where he attempts to win over male voters by pandering with clichés: coaching football, cracking jokes about football, and throwing in a few references to—what else?—football. “Hey, fellas, did you catch the game?” The left’s notion of masculinity isn’t just out of touch; it’s a caricature of itself. Because when all you’ve got is a caricature, well, caricature is what you deliver.

]I find that the Democrats’ attempt to connect with men has been nothing short of patronizing. Wearing a camo hat and barn jacket or bragging about pheasant hunting doesn't address the real concerns men have today. It’s a shallow attempt to appeal to masculinity, and I think we are smart enough to see through it.

Adding insult to injury, other pro-Harris messaging has been downright crude. Democratic content creators have launched a get-out-the-vote campaign at basketball games and bars, leaving messages like “Your vote is private. You don’t need to tell your boys you’re voting for Harris/Walz.” The implication here? Voting for Harris is something to be embarrassed about—a brilliant tactic if your goal is to win any man with a shred of self-respect. The tone-deafness peaks with another slogan: “Trump gives girls the ick. Vote Harris, Get Laid.” Yes, you read that right. It’s patronizing, lowbrow drivel that assumes men are little more than barely sentient cavemen, casting their ballots solely for the promise of carnal gratification.

How exactly do Democrats think this patronizing and demeaning rhetoric will inspire young men to vote for them? Bluntly, how do Ms. Harris and her fellow Democrats believe that men are even willing to hear what the left in the United States has to sell? What father is enthused by watching biological males compete in women's sports, effectively sidelining the very notion of fairness and merit for his daughters? What man enjoys inflation that strains budgets and makes owning a home or building wealth through property—a cornerstone of the American dream—seem increasingly out of reach? Any man trying to provide for their family or secure their future is left watching as financial instability becomes the norm.

On top of that, the influx of millions of illegal immigrants willing to work for lower wages only undercuts job security for many men, particularly those with lower educational attainment. It’s not xenophobia; it’s about economic survival, and it’s a concern felt by men of every race or creed. And while Democrats offer platitudes, men see their jobs threatened, their wages stagnant, prices going up, and little in the way of serious solutions. Safety for themselves and their families is paramount, and yet violent offenders seem to cycle in and out of the justice system. Men want to protect their families and communities, yet Democrat district attorneys seem to favor leniency over justice, releasing dangerous criminals back into the streets. So it’s not hard to see why many men are tuning out Ms. Harris’ message. It’s not just that they feel left out—they’re being alienated.

Thus, in courting the votes of and appealing to men, young men in particular, both the Harris and Trump campaigns have their appropriate surrogates. For Mr. Trump, it is Elon Musk, who, with all his flaws and occasional lack of decorum, stands as a counterpoint to the apathy and disdain many men feel toward the Democrats. Mr. Musk resonates with men who feel disenfranchised by policies they believe undermine their identity or diminish their place in society. While the left busies itself with demonizing masculinity, Mr. Musk embraces his own version unapologetically.

Whether it’s taking on entrenched interests or dreaming up audacious goals like colonizing Mars, Mr. Musk presents an image of ambition, strength, and the kind of leadership that resonates with men who feel that today’s wokeness and yesterday’s political correctness is undermining their identity. As The Wall Street Journal recently noted, Mr. Musk has carefully curated a public persona that embraces “tough-guy masculinity,” speaking directly to those who feel hemmed in by a culture that stifles ambition and strength. Case in point: at a recent Trump rally in the Philadelphia suburbs, Mr. Musk drew a crowd of enthusiastic supporters—many of whom had shown up specifically for him. There, Mr. Musk made a case for Trump’s re-election, framing it not just as another political contest but as part of a grander mission: the preservation of Western civilization itself.

In interviewing two men who happened to be graduates of Ridley High School, where the event was held, Tim Higgins, for the Wall Street Journal, reported on how Mr. Musk symbolizes hope to them. “The American dream, I want to attain that goal,” Luke Bencrowsky explained. “Just to have a good life, brother.” These young men see him as someone who has made it through sheer willpower, taking risks, and pursuing big dreams. As Bencrowsky said, Mr. Musk is a hero—“just a guy, at the same time, doing what’s right.” His friend, Giovanni Harness, agreed, describing Musk as a “down-to-earth guy” who doesn’t sugarcoat their harsh realities.

In his efforts to combat climate change—a challenge often described as both an existential threat and a crisis multiplier—Mr. Musk has not just pioneered the electric car with Tesla but also redefined space exploration with SpaceX, perfecting reusable rockets that have drastically reduced the cost of space travel. As if that weren’t enough, Mr. Musk has set his sights on the frontiers of health with Neuralink, aiming to conquer physical disabilities. Without SpaceX, it’s fair to say civilization’s gaze wouldn’t be fixed so optimistically on the stars. I still remember, as a child, when the Space Shuttle Atlantis completed its final mission. Even at the age of six, I felt deeply disappointed, as though humanity’s ambition to explore space had stalled (what young boy didn’t want to be an astronaut, after all?). Fast forward to 2020, when Mr. Musk’s SpaceX and Crew Dragon became the first privately owned spacecraft operator to ferry astronauts to the International Space Station, restoring America’s pride in space exploration and breaking our reliance on Russian rockets.

Now, contrast Musk’s visionary appeal to the young male vote with the Democrats’ offering: Kamala Harris’ surrogate, Tim Walz. Mr. Walz, by contrast, comes across as goofy, clownish, and not exceptionally bright—a self-described “knucklehead.” His forced persona is more like Homer Simpson than a serious leader: bumbling and perpetually out of his depth. And his attempts to court male voters? Superficial and, as mentioned earlier, downright demeaning.

It just seems like the left doesn’t understand men. At all. Mark Schipper, in a post on X, said, “If you’re wondering how the progressive left ends up picking Tim Walz to attract male voters with normative testosterone levels, this is the manner of media they take their cues from,” and shared a clip from a token member of the liberal “resistance,” Aaron Rupar, seemingly mocking Mr. Trump for his old age and being out of touch for “telling stories about Wally Pipp, who was born in 1893, and Lou Gehrig, who was born in 1903,” with Mr. Rupar commenting on what a failure it would be in “appealing to Barstool's young male audience.”

Mr. Schipper found it hysterical how Mr. Rupar “has convinced himself, preposterously, that men aren’t interested in sports history,” adding that “Being that out of touch with reality is how you lose.” It’s anecdotal, but I feel obligated to add that should one wonder whether men are, in fact, interested in sports history, I would point the said curious inquirer to my friend Sam’s Ultimate Team (a multiplayer game mode on FIFA, where players build and play matches with their created football clubs by collecting virtual cards of real-life players). Sam’s team is, as he says, a “Manchester United past and present” with former and current red devils such as David Beckham, Cristiano Ronaldo, and Marcus Rashford.

So, maybe “Coach Walz” and his fellows on the left could learn that from what should be an obvious playbook—sports history draws more interest to men than an over-the-top persona of a goofy, self-deprecating “knucklehead.” While Mr. Walz jokes and belittles Republicans as weird, allegedly “defining masculinity” according to our all-knowing press, Mr.Musk is out there building rockets, tackling massive engineering challenges, and making the impossible seem possible. Young men like Mr. Bencrowsky and Mr. Harness aren’t looking for the character Mr. Walz; they’re looking for someone like Mr. Musk—someone who can stand as a beacon of what’s possible when you refuse to settle for mediocrity.

In conclusion, the Harris campaign’s struggle with male voters highlights a broader disconnect between the Democratic Party, as an extension of the left, and men. Polling consistently shows that Mr. Trump is outperforming or overperforming Ms. Harris among men of all races and ages, and it is likely that, given his broader lead in the election as a whole, should he emerge victorious—it will be due to the Harris campaign’s pitiful performance with male voters. In viewing some of the prevailing discourse on social media, however, I conclude that the left will fail to understand this male disillusionment, with tweets that dismiss young men as being “lost to Tate, Rogan, Musk, and Peterson” or blast them as “wanting to be coddled”—which comes off as nothing but contemptuous toward them, with the same poster asserting the notion that men are driven by misogyny, and disinterested in democracy, rather than the acknowledgment that the left is failing to address their concerns. And with messaging like this, the problem will only exacerbate, all but ensuring that more young men will continue to tune out the Democratic Party's message altogether.

It looks like the election is Donald Trump’s to lose again. The last time many felt this way was in the aftermath of the presidential debate between Mr. Trump and Joe Biden, which led to the collapse of the former’s candidacy and marked the end of his political legacy. In hindsight, that debate resembled a climactic battle—perhaps even the Battle of Waterloo, with Mr. Trump and Mr. Biden standing in for Wellesley and Bonaparte. Following Mr. Biden’s decisive defeat, Mr. Trump surged in the polls, appearing as the favored contender to retake the presidency. Post-debate polling indicated a comfortable victory, foreshadowing Mr. Biden’s eventual “abdication” and Ms. Harris’s rise to the nomination.

Ms. Harris immediately experienced a surge in the polls, adoration, and excitement from the media; the novelty of the candidacy and the historical significance of the race (being incredibly atypical) helped animate some interest in what was a rather dull affair between two well-known candidates, and she entered August with “the big mo.” A well-delivered speech at the Democratic National Convention, a boost in favorability against an unpopular opponent—one could be forgiven for thinking that she would run away with it. Of course, Ms. Harris hid from the media during that summer, but did it matter? She was winning, or so we were led to believe.

Much like how the warmth of summer encapsulated these feelings, the coolness of autumn seems to reflect the present-day shift in her campaign. Gone are the energetic rallies delivered to jubilant crowds, substituted for lukewarm rehearsed speeches. Both Ms. Harris and her loyal deputy, Tim Walz, seem to be on the defensive rather than continuing an ascent. Momentum appears to have halted, and the campaign's appearances have become cautious. The more Ms. Harris appears, the more we learn why such appearances are rare.

Even with a friendly questioner like Bill Whitaker, Ms. Harris's performance was as uninspiring as it was revealing. She dodged critical questions with canned and repeated responses, leaving us to wonder what—if anything—she truly stands for. Ms. Harris has repeatedly refrained from delving into policy specifics, and Mr. Whitaker's questions were hardly challenging. Yet, Ms. Harris fumbled with empty answers, particularly on the issue of bringing down prices. Her response? More government spending and finger-pointing at the Trump tax cuts, which she implies are to blame for everything. There's not much for the American voter to latch onto there.

When pressed on the border crisis, Ms. Harris blamed Congress, overlooking her administration’s role in dismantling previous border policies, the administration that she is conveniently a part of when selling her qualifications and conveniently detached from when it comes to contrasting herself against an unpopular incumbent. On foreign policy, her responses to the war in the Middle East were similarly shallow; she made the usual platitudes about Israel's right to defend itself but declined to endorse any meaningful action against Iran or Hamas.

It's no secret why the campaign has been forced to appear on more shows and podcasts; internal polling data is raising alarm bells. But each time she steps in front of the camera, one is reminded why the campaign has sought to limit such exposure. It was easy for Americans to embrace her candidacy amid the campaign's early media fanfare and fresh tone. Though it may seem harsh to say, her current media blitz reminds us why she received 1 percent of the vote during the primaries. Ms. Harris's dilemma is that the more she reveals herself to the electorate, the worse her numbers get, yet if she hides—she is attacked for ducking the questions. Rather than galvanizing the electorate, her recent media rounds seem to yield little positive impact—if anything, they’re proving counterproductive.

Before this blitz, Ms. Harris led the RealClearPolitics average in almost all of the battleground states; she now trails Mr. Trump by 0.2 in Pennsylvania, 0.5 in Michigan, 1.4 in Arizona, and 1.0 in Georgia—a minor polling error in favor of Mr. Trump would result in him clinching the electoral college with him receiving 296 and Ms. Harris receiving 242; Mr. Trump would be 26 votes clear. Polymarkets' odds (of predicting the election's winner) have shifted to Mr. Trump; he can boast of having 53 percent odds of winning the election, up from his 49 percent at the beginning of the month.

There’s still a considerable stretch before Election Day, and the outcome remains uncertain. Whether Mr. Trump wins by a narrow or comfortable margin—or Ms. Harris does the same, neither result should be a surprise. This election brings to mind the race in 2004, the most similar comparison, when the polling margins in swing states hovered just under two percent, with some expecting John Kerry to prevail over George W. Bush and many others predicting a win for the president. Unsurprisingly, the polls missed, resulting in a fairly comfortable victory for Bush.

With some cynicism, one can’t help but wonder whether these polls are crafted to heighten the excitement and media spectacle of a ‘close race,’ or if they simply reflect it. In politics, a week is an eternity, and we still have three left; much can change before the final ballots are cast. Ms. Harris may yet regain her footing, or Mr. Trump could ultimately capitalize on the drift. But one thing is certain in this election full of unknowns: the unpredictability has never felt more acute.

Thirty-five days out from the presidential election, I find the cloudy weather of the Northeast perfectly encapsulates the country’s current mood. It’s frustrating to live through what is, in my opinion, among the worst presidential matchups we’ve been offered. The status quo may be so detestable that, once again, the nation chooses to elect the shaker-upper-in-chief, relegating us to four more years of divisiveness, borderline malignant narcissism, and pseudo-conservative governance. I don’t want any of my fellow conservatives to be surprised if Trump again tries to ram through amnesty for 2 million illegal immigrants, spends more than the preceding president, or necessitates more big government bailouts as a result of foolhardy tariffs.

In offering an alternative to this, Kamala Harris would like to remind us, first and foremost, that she grew up “in a middle-class family.” Having dual-employed Ph.D. parents—a father who was an economics professor at Stanford and a mother who was a biomedical scientist—hardly qualifies as “middle class.” After that, she’ll promise that, while the nation has had transformational leadership for the last four years, only the incumbent vice president is the “hope and change” candidate suited to solve all the problems that haven’t been solved in those four years. There’s nothing to indicate that Ms. Harris would be an effective president. At the risk of sounding cynical, she is, at best, an empty vessel, devoid of any rigid ideological moorings and unrelenting in the pursuit of power. This makes her very dangerous at the helm of a Democratic trifecta—and potentially moderate if tamed by a Republican Congress.

The modern progressivism Ms. Harris previously adhered to—when it suited her—rooted in baby boomer ideals and revitalized by Bernie Sanders-supporting millennials has run its course. Wokeness, for lack of a better word, is exhausted. As we look to the future, we are witnessing, among many of the electorate, support for a revival of classic liberalism: an emphasis on free markets, personal liberty, and intellectual openness. As Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith once said, “Liberalism is resurgent. One reason is that more and more people are so painfully aware of the alternative.” With the excesses of the progressive left having gone too far for the liking of most Americans, we will likely see a return to more traditional moorings in both parties.

The right faces similar challenges. The cadre of Trump-adjacent politicians—Kari Lake, Mark Robinson, and others—are not the ideological heirs. Mr. Trump has little interest in politics and policy and won’t drive any change like Barry Goldwater. They lack a guiding philosophy, a coherent vision for conservatism beyond the cult of personality they orbit. As I’ve written before, their fates are intertwined with Mr. Trump’s: should he lose, fade into obscurity, or leave office, they are likely to turn on one another in a cycle of betrayal, much like the permanent revolutionaries of Soviet Russia. We’ve seen this before. Edmund Burke once cautioned, “A state without the means of some change is without the means of its conservation.” Without a clear ideological compass, the right risks being led astray by those who seek power for its own sake.

However, let’s not deceive ourselves—this election matters—every election matters. But American history cannot, and will not, be defined by a single president's term. We have endured far worse. From the bloody Civil War that tore us apart to the economic crises that left us in despair to the triumphs of two World Wars, America has always emerged stronger. Our innovation, resilience, and unparalleled standard of living are a testament to the enduring spirit of the American people. As General Patton famously said in his typical brash style, “We're not holding a goddamned thing. We're advancing constantly, and we're not interested in holding anything.” Crass though it may be, Patton perfectly encapsulates the indomitable American way of life: keep pushing forward, no matter the challenges.

So here we are, staring down a month of joyless politicking and four years of inevitable disappointment. But there is hope. We will march forward, learning, growing, and adapting as we've always done. One hopes we can finally close the chapter on this era of fear and loathing and begin anew. As Winston Churchill reminded us in the darkest hours of history, “If you're going through hell, keep going.”

And so we will.

By all measures, Kamala Harris’s performance in the debate was effective; her victory was triumphant. The analysis should focus less on her polished delivery and more on the visceral reaction she elicited from Donald Trump, the ever-unpredictable linchpin. Her strategy was as transparent as it was successful: bait the former president into fits of pique, and, predictably, he did not disappoint. From the moment she subtly questioned the size of his crowds, Mr. Trump spiraled into a frenzy of self-aggrandizing, irrational rants—once again proving himself woefully unable to resist even the most obvious provocations. His unraveling was so predictable that conspiracy theorists might be tempted to question whether he was in on the strategy, willfully playing the part of the agitated antagonist.

Mr. Trump’s inability to string together coherent thoughts and his near-obsessive focus on relitigating the 2020 election rendered his debate performance an unmistakable display of political self-destruction. He meandered through nonsensical assertions—from alleging electoral fraud to engaging in bizarre digressions about stolen pets—leaving the impression of a man utterly unmoored from reality. It is regrettable, though unsurprising, that the right, under Mr. Trump’s auspices, has mutated into a movement fueled by delusion and paranoia, led by a figure whose disdain for intellectual rigor and narcissism is palpable.

It’s no secret that politics thrives on rival visions and dynamic, if not combative, exchanges, which are welcomed as part of healthy discourse. Yet, it’s revealing that what sparked Mr. Trump’s ire during the debate was not a defense of the Biden-Harris administration’s domestic policies—policies that have undeniably caused significant distress for many Americans. Instead, what enraged him were Ms. Harris’s remarks about “world leaders laughing at him” and “people leaving his rallies early”—personal affronts that knocked him off course in a moment reminiscent of Ronald Reagan's iconic “There you go again,” exposing his vulnerability to even minor challenges to his image. This moment underscored the motivations of his campaign: the perceived injustice of losing the previous election, narcissistic indulgence, and his insatiable desire for media attention.

Mr. Trump stumbled over what should have been an unassailable point regarding abortion. Rather than seizing upon the clear legislative record—a bill signed by Governor Tim Walz, which expunged language that once protected the unborn even in the final stages of pregnancy—he chose instead to indulge in hyperbole about “executions of babies.” Mr. Trump’s political style possesses this baffling inability to articulate a serious and morally potent argument, which is not surprising given that he is neither serious nor particularly concerned with morality. Confronted with the predictable Democratic rejoinder that such late-term abortions are rare, Mr. Trump could have deftly pivoted, pointing out that, rare or not, the mere existence of such a law is an affront to reason and decency. Yet, once again, he retreated into the familiar refuge of bombast, failing to score points against Ms. Harris, her running-mate, or the administration’s policies.

As the campaign wears on, the question arises: how long will conservatives continue to defend the indefensible? Each time Mr. Trump takes the stage and loses himself in a quagmire of his own creation, he reinforces the image his opponents wish to cast upon him. He, the Republican party, and by extension, conservatism, are portrayed as devoid of intellect, inarticulate on policy, and grounded in baseless conspiracy. Surely, this cannot be the foundation upon which the future of conservatism is built.

This evening serves as a stark reminder of why much of the conservative intelligentsia and media apparatus were misguided in not condemning, and in some cases rationalizing, Mr. Trump's retreat from Ron DeSantis and Nikki Haley earlier this year, as Mr. Trump avoided every GOP primary debate. Those who celebrated this decision—his loyalists—argued that he did not need to debate since he would 'win anyway'—perhaps valid for the primary, but certainly not for the general election. However, recall that these same loyalists likely believe he won the last election if not for the “fraud.”

The troubling undercurrent within conservative media is a reluctance to confront the weaknesses of its standard-bearer, preferring instead to shield him from scrutiny. By evading the debates, Mr. Trump deprived his base of the opportunity to see him defend his “ideas” (or whatever passes for ideas in his political universe) and exposed a more profound insecurity: he may falter when faced with a disciplined, competent adversary like Mr. DeSantis. Mr. DeSantis presents himself as a serious candidate, capable of articulating policy and engaging in erudite sparring—a task that Mr. Trump, whose intellectual grasp at times appears brilliant, and yet can appear so tenuous that it teeters precariously on the precipice of irrelevance, is wholly unequipped to handle.

The anti-intellectual strain of conservatism, one that places personality above principle and spectacle above substance, therefore erred in viewing debates as spectacles to be skipped at one's convenience, rather than crucibles where leaders are made—or unmade. In shielding Mr. Trump from this process, the conservative commentariat denied the Republican electorate the opportunity to witness whether their chosen champion could still withstand the pressures of a serious political contest. The truth of his inability now uncomfortably slips to the surface, exploited by Ms. Harris.

In the debate, Mr. Trump regrettably failed to convey any substantive transformation from his 2020 persona, and neglected to demonstrate the maturation or reflective growth that voters may have hoped for. He did little to persuade swing voters, who are likely to shift toward Ms. Harris. When one reflects upon the razor-thin margins of the 2020 contest, it is crucial to remember that, particularly with the nature of the Electoral College, even the slightest loss of voter confidence can have disproportionate political consequences. For the swing voter, all the histrionics and spectacle of the evening, the substance—or rather, the lack thereof—on display by Mr. Trump allowed Ms. Harris to ascend from the wings of obscurity into the frame of a viable alternative.

The Congress of the United States seems determined to approach another government shutdown; the repetitive nature of these crises would be comical if its pathetic frequency didn't lend it a semblance of tragedy. As often happens, the nation finds itself purportedly on the brink of disaster with the ominous specter of a “fiscal emergency” looming over Washington. Both the shutdown drama and the supposed bipartisan agreements presented at the 11th hour are nothing more than political theater—an elaborate distraction from the real, long-term fiscal irresponsibility that has plagued both parties for decades.

Politicians posture, throw accusations across the aisle, and pretend to champion fiscal discipline. Republicans oft sing a tune about how reckless amounts of spending by their Democratic opponents threaten the nation's finances, while Democrats similarly decry Republican “tax cuts for the rich” and allege that they focus on benefits for corporate donors and the wealthy at the expense of the deficit. In reality, both Democrats and Republicans are equally liable for this gross mismanagement.

No politician or party is willing to make the hard choices necessary to rein in spending as we hurtle toward fiscal collapse. Instead, our Soviet-style gerontocracy in Congress—aging politicians, most of whom were born before 1960—clings to power by prioritizing their interests—reelection. Cutting spending is rarely popular. As a result, they are content to kick the proverbial can down the road, leaving the next generation with an unprecedented mountain of debt.

Shutdowns are a charade. Politicians and Beltway pundits treat these moments as existential crises, but they allow both parties to avoid addressing the real drivers of our national debt. Shutdown discourse fixates on short-term battles over discretionary spending—which accounts for about a third of the federal budget—while ignoring the far more consequential issue of mandatory spending, which makes up the bulk of government expenditures.​

Congress has until September 30 to avoid the latest shutdown, but the course of action they will take is predictable. Lawmakers will scramble for last-minute stopgap measures and temporary funding patches, declare themselves heroes for keeping the lights on, and the cycle will likely repeat. Meanwhile, the deficit will continue to balloon unchecked, expanding upon itself like a black hole.

The first, and perhaps most glaring, culprit is entitlements. Entitlement spending—Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid accounted for 63% of total federal outlays in 2021, with the untouchable sacred cow that is Social Security costing $1.4 trillion alone. Due to the aging of the American population, the shrinking labor force participation rate, and rising healthcare costs, entitlements are projected to account for $4 trillion of outlays by 2033—eclipsing the tax revenue generated by the U.S. government.

One must conclude that the only path toward solvency is means testing. Many American seniors are quite wealthy and benefit from government stimulus and rising asset values, such as 401(k)s, homes, and stocks, while their fixed incomes, like Social Security, increase with inflation. This contrasts the financial struggles of younger Americans, who face high living costs and difficulty accumulating assets. Those seeking to conserve this status quo, oddly enough, the liberals in this equation, criticize those seeking entitlement reforms as amoral robber barons, yet where is the morality in subsidizing the life of the old rich off the backs of the younger working populace?

The common retort against means testing is often from those who stand to benefit, insisting that “they paid into it” and, therefore, are entitled to it irrespective of their financial situation. This argument is not compelling as there are several programs that affluent taxpayers pay into but do not typically benefit from, such as Unemployment Insurance, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, Pell Grants, and Federal Student Aid. Social Security was established to provide a safety net to prevent poor seniors, ensuring those in this limited circumstance would have a safety net to fall into, not serve as a Universal Basic Income for the elderly.

A report from the Manhattan Institute points out that these programs disproportionately benefit high-income seniors, many of whom are the wealthiest generation in U.S. history, with millions holding more than $1 million in investable assets. At the end of 2023, Americans over 70 held 30% of the country's wealth despite comprising roughly 11% of the population. Lack of means testing creates a moral hazard, as high-income Americans become disincentivized from managing their finances responsibly or saving for retirement. There is an erroneous notion that Social Security benefits always match contributions, yet the Manhatten Institute's study concluded that a high-earning couple would receive $836,000 in benefits for $812,000 in contributions. As the benefits for wealthy retirees increase, the deficits of the program continue to grow at an unsustainable level.

Means testing presents the perfect compromise between both ideologies. It satisfies fiscal conservatives by providing a significant and beneficial cut to spending, while avoiding the need for tax increases and their adverse effects on investment, job creation, productivity, and economic growth. Liberals should also support this approach as it is fiscally prudent without harming those who genuinely depend on these programs—the poor.

Yet, both parties balk at the idea. Republicans fear alienating the older voters they presently depend on for political survival, and Democrats are too beholden to the notion that Social Security is sacrosanct. The political stalemate is exacerbated by polarization—rather than work together, whichever party moves first to touch benefits would immediately be pounced on by the other. The result is a bipartisan failure that continues to bankrupt the country.

The most significant failure on this front comes from the Republicans. Conservatism is rooted in limited government, lessened and more efficient spending, and the encouragement of personal responsibility. Once the party of fiscal restraint, with House Speaker Newt Gingrich and his majority working with President Bill Clinton to balance the budget in 1998, the Republicans have since abandoned their commitment to cutting spending—let alone reforming entitlements.

Conservative think tanks, columnists in the National Review, and other hubs of right-wing intellectualism remain the last vestiges of entitlement reform as the political reality has become messier. The last serious attempt to address the program’s impending insolvency came in 2005 when President George W. Bush warned of the threat to Social Security’s solvency. Mr. Bush warned that for the program to remain alive for America's young, it needed to be dramatically reformed and suggested partially privatizing the program, allowing Americans to divert their Social Security tax into investments and creating individual accounts.

Democrats unanimously opposed these reforms, and Republican intra-party divisions and public discontent helped contribute to the 'blue wave' in the 2006 midterms. In these elections, Democrats regained control of both chambers of Congress, effectively killing the reform. The reality is that, despite its necessity, entitlement reform is incredibly unpopular—Social security is often described as a third rail of politics; one dares not touch it. The general public has difficulty visualizing the consequences of events decades away. It is more inclined to support politicians who flaunt a glistening smile and insist everything is fine and that no cuts are necessary.

This brings us to the modern Republican Party's capitulation on entitlements. In 2016, the populist insurgency led by Donald Trump remade American political coalitions, and the Republican party abandoned many of its conservative principles, particularly those regarding entitlements and spending. Unlike Mitt Romney, Paul Ryan, or George W. Bush, Mr. Trump rejected touching Social Security or Medicare. Instead, Mr. Trump repeatedly campaigned to “protect” these programs in 2016, 2020, and 2024, criticizing Nikki Haley, Ron DeSantis, and others for proposing reforms to the programs that would’ve done a far better job “protecting” them than inaction. Mr. Trump champions the status quo as it relates to entitlements because he knows these programs particularly resonate with his base, which is comprised of former Democrats (predisposed to be in favor of social welfare), older voters, and those in rural areas who are reliant on government assistance.

Mr. Trump and his populism offer vague optics-driven promises rather than robust policy, suggesting that it is possible to "have your cake and eat it too," where short-term and positive-sounding benefits are often championed and long-term or damaging consequences ignored. In this case, Mr. Trump, and almost every other politician, would rather keep the unsustainable trajectory of these programs in the long term than risk losing political capital.

Mr. Trump utterly failed when it came to government spending. Simply cutting taxes and proclaiming victory is inadequate. The 115th Congress, the last Republican Trifecta, was a prime example of the Republican party's fiscal policy failure. The Trump administration spent $3.8 trillion in its first two years, despite promises to reduce the size of government and a campaign pledge to cut the national debt—outpacing President Obama’s emergency spending during the Great Recession. This is not fiscal responsibility; it is fiscal insanity.

Beyond entitlements, the federal government is riddled with inefficiency and waste. Yet the problem isn't merely the size of the government—it's the sprawling inefficiency that infects its operations. The government should do fewer things but do them well. Today’s government does too much and, as a result, does it poorly.

Despite repeated calls for reduced government size, federal employment has surged in the last decade by 10%. The federal government now employs 2 million people, often in redundant tasks that could be consolidated or eliminated for efficiency and decreased costs. Beyond mere staffing, the federal government’s inefficiency is compounded by the overlapping missions of its various agencies, generating a bureaucratic labyrinth that hemorrhages taxpayer dollars.

Consider, for example, the Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency, both responsible for administering renewable energy programs. A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report discovered 82 wind-related initiatives spread across nine agencies, including DOE and EPA, often duplicating financial support for the same projects—this fragmentation results in unnecessary financial excess. According to the GAO, eliminating this overlap could save the federal government up to $500 billion.

Both parties have failed to make the tough decisions necessary to bring America back to fiscal sanity. The real tragedy of government shutdowns is that they distract from the more profound crisis: a government addicted to spending, a political system unwilling to confront entitlement reform, and a future generation left to clean up the mess. If we are serious about solving the debt crisis, it’s time to cut the bloat by reforming entitlements and demanding efficiency from government agencies. The time for thumb-twirling and theatrics is over. We need leadership willing to make the hard choices—before it’s too late. Otherwise, we’re rearranging the Titanic deck chairs while Washington fiddles away.

“It is now our turn to do what generations before us have done, guided by optimism and faith, to fight for this country we love, to fight for the ideals we cherish, and to uphold the awesome responsibility that comes with the greatest privilege on Earth: the privilege and pride of being an American.”

-Kamala D. Harris

It’s been just over thirty days since President Joe Biden suspended his reelection bid, Vice President Harris announced her campaign, and five days since the Democrats officially nominated her. The Democratic Convention last week was a success—a massive victory for a well-run campaign and for Ms. Harris herself, who is potentially facing the most unusual road to the White House we've seen in years.

Ms. Harris introduced herself to the country in her acceptance speech. These biographical speeches, often given by politicians, can come off as self-centered, egotistical, and vain. However, her narrative avoided that, instead humanizing someone frequently struggling with presentation (recall the cringeworthy NASA video from 2021). Pundits noted the lengthy tribute to her mother, an immigrant from India, who raised her and her siblings as a single mother. Harris celebrated her mother’s resilience despite adversarial circumstances and highlighted her “trailblazing work” as a biomedical scientist specializing in breast cancer research.

She then defined herself, particularly her career as a district attorney. Ms. Harris recounted how, after discovering in high school that her close friend, Wanda, was being sexually abused by her stepfather, she was motivated to become a prosecutor: "That is one of the reasons I became a prosecutor. To protect people like Wanda because I believe everyone has a right to safety, dignity, and justice." She emphasized that her role as a prosecutor was always for the people—noting how she would always be charged not in the victim's name but “the people,” as she explained that justice is a collective responsibility and that no one should fight alone.

In formally accepting her nomination to the immense cheer of the crowd, Ms. Harris was surprisingly apolitical—she didn't mention the word “Democrat” once. Instead, she positioned herself as a leader for all Americans, transcending partisan divides and avoiding the typically left-leaning rhetoric based on grievance and class warfare. She portrayed herself as someone not hostile to America's past but equally dedicated to a hopeful, future-oriented agenda. Ms. Harris was dismissive of Mr. Trump, describing him as an “unserious man,” yet energized her base by reminding them that the consequences of his return would be “extremely serious.”

On policy, Ms. Harris offered some Republican-sounding pledges, including a commitment to border security, reiterating support for the Senate bill that failed to pass this summer, and deterrence against Iran and its proxies. Ms. Harris specifically championed support for building “the most lethal fighting force.” Domestically, she opted for a positive-sounding slogan of an “opportunity economy,” no doubt a phrase revised and tested by many pollsters. She also supported a middle-class tax cut and increasing housing availability in true 'YIMBY' fashion. Conspicuously absent was any mention of her previous positions on price controls, unrealized gains taxes, or wealth taxes—though to err on the side of caution, it would be best if she were not given a Democratic trifecta, to avoid being “infected again” by these silly notions.

Her speech was not a policy checklist, and it's clear she has a tough road ahead in winning over fencesitters—no matter how much she may try to backpedal. Her Senate voting record led to her being ranked by GovTrack as 'the most liberal,' to the left of Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders. Her flip-flops on abolishing private insurance, supporting a border wall, defunding law enforcement, and fracking gave John Kerry a run for his money. For someone in elected politics for twenty years, it's odd to recalibrate views entirely—though we’ve seen this play out before.

Her campaign’s strategy bears the hallmarks of Dick Morris’ triangulation strategy, which successfully got Bill Clinton reelected in 1996 by positioning him as neither left-wing nor right-wing but instead offering a ‘third way.’ What makes triangulation interesting in its application today is that the political coalitons and Republican Party of the Trumpian era are unrecognizable and incomparable to the GOP of 1996 and the candidacy of Bob Dole. One major shift is the suburban electorate's shift toward the Democrats—think of former Romney and McCain voters who now cast their ballots for the Democrats, and the similar rural, exurb, and working-class shift towards the Republicans. The primary clash between Haley and Trump revealed the emergence of new Republican class warfare, with Trump’s base of less-educated working-class voters going toe-to-toe with Haley’s “old-guard” constituency of wealthier, educated Republicans, independents, and disaffected Democrats—if you break down the primary results by precinct, Haley did best in wealthy suburbs that have slid away from the Republicans since 2016.

Billionaire donors and special interest groups like Americans for Prosperity were once assets of the Republican Party to the detriment of their Democratic foes. Now, however, the 'MAGA' wing finds itself at odds with these allegedly sinister forces. For evidence of the GOP's populist, and frankly left-leaning, pivot under Trump, I received a mailer from the Trump campaign addressed directly to me (oddly enough, as a young person) pledging ‘NO TAX ON SOCIAL SECURITY! PROTECT SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE!’ and a pledge that entitlement reform—a necessity—is off the table. This would have been an unthinkable policy position for a Republican nominee just eight years ago. With Trump and his MAGA movement figuratively and literally poaching the policy and voters of the 1990s Democratic Party, would it be inconceivable that the Democrats, with this sudden talk of ‘tax-cuts’ and ‘opportunity,’ are doing the same with the 1990s Republican Party—with all this talk of ‘opportunity,’ ‘freedom,’ and a new, yet undoubtedly welcome, unapologetic commitment to American exceptionalism?

Of course, I remain skeptical of this newfound centrism. No matter how much she tries to hide it, Ms. Harris is part of an administration with an average approval rating of 39%, according to FiveThirtyEight—not exactly an indication of success. I, and by extension this publication, have been very critical of the Biden administration domestically, citing its love for regulation, which has led to household energy costs escalating by approximately $10,000 since Mr. Biden took office. Additionally, the administration's economic policy and proposals have been far from ideal, and its foreign policy is particularly weak. Ms. Harris also lied a fair amount during her convention address, dramatically misrepresenting the Supreme Court ruling on Trump’s immunity case, the 2017 TCJA as just a 'tax cut for the rich,' and claiming that Trump would limit access to birth control—arguably the most far-fetched and ridiculous of them all.

Still, there are positions where I not only align with Ms. Harris but also believe she is preferable to Trump—namely on trade, in contrast to his ill-fated protectionism, and in her unapologetic commitment to NATO. While I think Mr. Trump has a decent chance of winning this election, I cannot help but have an instinctual feeling that he and the Republicans are poised for defeat. This is largely due to their abandonment of policy and principle, exacerbated by an internal civil war fueled by a hostile takeover of the party by reactionary populists and grifters. These grifters, more interested in personal gain, media attention, and short-term victories than in long-term conservative goals, have hollowed out the GOP, steering it away from its core values. If Ms. Harris wins, it will further prove that the GOP's failure to nominate Ron DeSantis or Nikki Haley was due to an electorate and conservative media more obsessed with loyalty to Trump than with enacting a sustainable, generational conservative realignment that could secure lasting electoral success.

Her victory, if it is to be, will be due to the influence of those who voted for Haley or DeSantis and would have preferred either as the nominee—voters who became disaffected with Biden’s policy, the disaster in Afghanistan, and crave a return to normalcy and efficient, effective government. They are 'center-right,' often relatively affluent, and were the coveted target of Glenn Youngkin’s successful Virginia gubernatorial campaign in 2021—a victory that followed an 11-point Democratic victory in the state the year prior. They comprise the Never-Trump or Never-Again-Trump coalition—which is vast.

Opposition to Trump’s bid from the right comes from ultra-conservatives like Mike Pence, the 'character counts' and the pious crowd (think Mitt Romney), the business-minded likes of Rob Portman and Pat Toomey, or foreign policy gurus like Bill Kristol and John Bolton. While Kristol appears to have 'crossed the aisle' to the Democratic Party, potentially never to return, it's not like the others are abandoning conservatism and rushing to embrace big government. If anything, they just want a candidate of moral integrity, competence, and effective policy. I have no doubt that most of these names, and the voters who align with them, will return to their original party loyalties when Trump and his cohort have come and gone—but until then, anything goes.

While Ms. Harris might be masking her policy as a 'Trojan horse' and pandering to focus groups, I still believe that, even if insincere, her appeals to 'freedom' and 'opportunity' show that the Democrats not only understand where the political center is but are willing to meet it. Democrats were presented with an opportunity, with Joe Biden’s victory, to unite the country after the four years of Trump. The party and Mr. Biden failed to meet the moment, instead doubling down on and indulging in divisive rhetoric and erroneous policy. Yet, instead of being punished, Democrats have been given the “reset button” in running against the same man again with a new candidate. Ms. Harris has made numerous missteps, but this gesture toward the center and embrace of reality could lead to her winning undecided voters, the presidency itself, and turning her story into one of bipartisan appeal and leadership—allowing her to be, as she is fond of saying, “unburdened by what has been.”

The Democratic National Convention in Chicago kicked off yesterday, and in tune with Harris's campaign theme of “brat summer,” it was less of a policy seminar and more of a festival of good cheer and vibes—which isn’t necessarily bad. Throughout the night, the energy on the convention floor was electric. Democrats seemed to be relishing the fun with Harris-themed Converse sneakers, impromptu dancing, and, my favorite, the “Coconut Caucus” badges. Harris/Walz T-shirts flew off the shelves like hotcakes at a state fair.

It’s an incredible contrast to the party that seemed resigned to its defeat just two months ago when President Joe Biden took on former President Donald Trump in a CNN debate that proved to be one of the most consequential in political history. It gave me no pleasure to write about it then, but Mr. Biden demonstrated he was hardly the man he was four years ago, and it became evident that he could not win another term. Republicans salivated at the prospect of electoral triumph, with dreams of a 1992-esque landslide. Democrats had almost accepted a second Trump term with the same sense of defeat Napoleon must have felt at Waterloo, watching Blücher's army close in from a distance. But that was then. Now, Democrats have every reason to feel invigorated as Ms. Harris quickly closed the gap with Mr. Trump, turning what seemed like a certain defeat into an even chance.

I only watched some of the convention speeches before quickly asking myself ‘why,’ given that forcing myself to listen to what often sounds like nonsense from political characters I’ve come to dread during my time in punditry seemed to border on masochism. I fell asleep before Biden's anticipated speech—shameful for a would-be reporter, I know. The conspiratorial part of my mind wonders if this late scheduling was deliberate so that if Mr. Biden made any gaffes or repeated his debate performance, it would be out of sight and out of mind.

Luckily, thanks to the internet, I could catch his speech this morning and was quite impressed. After bowing out of the race, it was clear that Mr. Biden was compelled to yield to the sheer force of Nancy Pelosi’s will rather than voluntarily step aside. Still, Mr. Biden’s words did not show any bitterness. Beginning with one of the longest-standing ovations I’ve ever seen any politician receive, I was amazed by his energy and rhetorical conviction, even though his campaign rhetoric didn’t necessarily sway me (I doubt I was the target anyway).

The most noticeable theme of the night was the shift from the divisive “woke” themes of the last convention and recent party trends. This time, the event was infused with patriotic fervor, with “USA!” chants echoing through the arena. The opening night was capped off by a stirring performance of the Star-Spangled Banner by the Soul Children of Chicago, delivered to a convention draped in American flags. It was quite the contrast to the progressive activism of 2020—statues being torn down, flags burning, and activists chanting, “America was never great.”

Most of the rhetoric sounded like a return to the Democratic campaign of the 1990s, emphasizing labor unions, support for trade and vocational schools, and “tax the rich” proposals. And for a party focused on the future, none of the delegates or convention-goers seemed to mind the retro vibe. In fact, the crowd’s enthusiastic response suggested that, at least for now, the party is embracing a more traditional, unifying message and is opting to present itself as the inoffensive party of normalcy, leaving the more radical elements of its coalition to the sidelines.

Yet, there’s still plenty for the Republicans to latch onto. Ms. Harris has shied away from policy specifics and continues to avoid the media as if they bore a plague. This makes sense, given that her first foray into policy was to announce support for price controls to crack down on ‘price gauging,’ a slip of the tongue more expected from Mr. Biden than the much younger Ms. Harris. But conventions aren’t necessarily about winning the undecided or shaking up the race; they are about rallying the base, and on that front, it delivered.

The novelty of her candidacy primarily drives Ms. Harris's momentum, the excitement of a fresh face, and the historical circumstances of Mr. Biden stepping down—but how long can this bubble last? She and her running mate, Tim Walz, are clearly betting on the election being decided by personality rather than policy, which may be a strategic choice given that on the policy, they are considerably to the left of the average voter. However, the Republicans have chosen a nominee poorly positioned to capitalize on this. Trump's campaign is disorganized, bombastic rather than strategic, and seems more like a rerun of a tired reality show rather than a campaign of the future. One of his team’s more recent surrogates, Hulk Hogan, who spoke on Mr. Trump’s behalf at the Republican convention, was recently caught at a bar asking a crowd if he should “body slam [Kamala]” before making disparaging remarks about her heritage, asking, “Is she a chameleon...is she Indian?”

So even if the Democrats, despite their veneer of moderation, have nominated a ticket considerably to the left of the average American, the reality is that this election, unless something changes, will hinge on personality rather than politics. The energy at the DNC is similar to Barack Obama’s campaign in 2008, which Republicans underestimated at the time. Mr. Obama was also fawned upon by the media and shirked policy specifics instead focusing on a campaign of two things: hope and change.

It could easily turn out that Harris's vibes-based approach is all that is needed to triumph; the off-putting and outright weird rhetoric from the likes of Mr. Hogan does not help the Republican cause. Ultimately, the test for the Democrats comes with Ms. Harris's Thursday night speech, which voters will watch with eager eyes. Considering that she is already tied, or within the margin of error, in many battleground states, a well-received convention address could give her a solid lead ahead of Labor Day or leave her campaign treading water.

And it’s true, her speech will be the talk of the town for the next week, but let’s not kid ourselves—everyone's waiting for the big showdown on September 10. The sparks will fly in the debate stage, and after that fateful June 27 debate transformed this election, all eyes will be glued to this next face-off. The Democrats can only hope that Ms. Harris carries enough momentum into that debate to keep the wind at her back.

There’s a great idiom, cited in a variety of spots, whether it be in politics or films like The Dark Knight, of “the dog that caught the car”—for a person who reached a milestone or goal or obtained something and doesn’t know what to do with it. This perfectly captures Donald Trump's campaign. After Joe Biden’s historically disastrous debate performance, followed shortly by Mr. Trump escaping an assassin’s bullet by millimeters courtesy of a quick turn of the head, and in doing so gifting us one of the most viral images in politics—that of a bloodied Trump shaking his fist in defiance, it seemed his victory was inevitable.

Riding into the convention, Mr. Trump boasted he had a consistent lead over Mr. Biden—even beginning to edge ahead or come within striking distance in states like New Jersey and Minnesota, which a Republican hasn’t won in decades. And after a triumphant convention, a celebration of his survival, the pick of J.D. Vance, and an outreach to his newfound friends in Silicon Valley, it seemed that “45” was destined to become “47”. That was, of course, until Joe Biden decided to get the last laugh—shifting ego and pride aside to instead bow out and endorse his Vice President, Kamala Harris, for the Democratic nomination.

And just like that, the campaign was transformed overnight. Instead of running against a tired and unpopular Biden with four years of incumbency to run against, the 2024 campaign has become a tale of “young vs. old,” “future vs. past.” While Mrs. Harris may be 60 (though this is juvenile by D.C. standards) and the incumbent Vice President, she presents herself as “unburdened by what has been,” a quote she is fond of, and comes off as young and hip. In contrast, a more lethargic and weathered Mr. Trump seems like a record player spinning the same song for the last eight years.

As Mrs. Harris rides a wave of grassroots momentum, Mr. Trump suddenly found himself besieged by an unrelenting flood of negative press smashing the walls of Mar-a-Lago. J.D. Vance has proven to be the most unpopular vice presidential pick in modern history, kicking off the campaign with an inspiring and moving convention speech before finding himself on the defensive for comments about “childless cat ladies,” similar to Hillary Clinton’s “basket of deplorables” remark and poor performances at rallies. Things haven’t gone swimmingly for Mr. Trump either.

On Wednesday, he accepted an invitation to Chicago to be interviewed by the National Association of Black Journalists, which went about as well as you’d expect. Rachel Scott began by asking why Black voters should support him, citing his controversial comments, such as questioning Barack Obama's birthplace and telling four Congresswomen to “go back to where they came from.” Mr. Trump immediately snapped back, saying, “I don’t think I’ve ever been asked a question in such a horrible manner, a first question.” He then questioned Mrs. Scott, asking, “Are you with ABC? Because I think they’re a fake news network, a terrible network.”

When asked if he believed Mrs. Harris was a DEI hire, as some of his surrogates suggested, Mr. Trump said he didn't know but then went on a rant that revealed his campaign strategy for the upcoming months. To improve his margins with Black voters, a demographic he performed better with than previous Republican nominees, his strategy is to claim Kamala is not Black. “She was always of Indian heritage, and she was only promoting Indian heritage,” Mr. Trump explained. “I didn’t know she was Black until a number of years ago when she happened to turn Black, and now she wants to be known as Black. So I don’t know, is she Indian or is she Black?” He quickly added, “I respect either one, but she obviously doesn’t, because she was Indian all the way, and then all of a sudden she made a turn—she became a Black person,” before suggesting that “somebody should look into that too.”

Mrs. Harris, whose mother is Indian and father is Jamaican, embodies both Black and Indian heritage—a concept some critics, including Mr. Trump, appear incapable of grasping. It's hilarious to suggest that Kamala is “pretending to be Black” for politically advantageous reasons; I'm sure that when she enrolled at Howard, an HBCU, 42 years ago—the 18-year-old Kamala Harris was secretly planning a campaign of deception decades prior. It’s ludicrous.

After drawing bewildered laughter from the audience, he spent the rest of the interview remarking on how Ms. Scott “treated [me] so rudely... because—she was very rude,” prompting a hot-mic moment from Harris Faulkner, one of Mr. Trump's most sympathetic interviewers, who was heard muttering “oh my goodness” in disbelief. Eventually, he was pulled from the stage by his campaign team just 34 minutes into what was slated as an hour-long interview. With the shockwaves reverberating, it's quite clear that Mr. Trump’s campaign is on the verge of imploding.

It’s not wrong to suggest that Mr. Trump could only mount an effective campaign against Joe Biden and that the switch of candidates has totally blindsided him. He’s spent the last two weeks desperately searching for avenues of attack against Mrs. Harris as the polls tighten and voter registration and enthusiasm increase for the Democrats. And when he’s not pouting about being “refunded” for campaign funds spent against Mr. Biden or going off on odd tangents about Hannibal Lecter, he’s shooting himself in the foot.

His plan to attack Mrs. Harris for her “phoniness” is a lazy rehash of his 2016 strategy against Hillary Clinton, an unsurprising move for a man who seems stuck in the past. Attacking her on this avenue, bound to offend, lose votes, and be outright baffling rather than on policy avenues, where one could ascribe ‘phoniness’ for her flip-flopping, is not the hallmark of a winning campaign. Her mixed heritage is a fact, and attacking it only highlights his campaign's desperation.

Attacking Mrs. Clinton as a “phony,” “corrupt,” and “untrustworthy” worked because she had been the archenemy of conservatives for the 30 years she spent in Washington—while Mr. Trump was a “fresh” and “exciting” political outsider. Mr. Trump does not boast the same freshness nor excitement this time; many Americans, even those voting for him, regard his candidacy and potential return to the White House with palpable dread. Thus, these attacks on Mrs. Harris will not prove as effective and, if anything, serve as a detraction.

The last two weeks have possibly been the worst in any of Mr. Trump’s three campaigns, and indeed, many of his staff and supporters alike are dealing with a rather queer feeling that the walls are closing in.