How Trump Perfected Regime Change
The U.S. has turned foreign policy disasters into triumphs
I finally have decided to return to writing after months of hiatus being preoccupied with university. Given that I have relocated to London, I believe I may end up covering more global affairs than I had previously, and likely will pivot to covering more domestic matters. But do expect more to come!
Donald Trump’s actions in both Venezuela and the newest war with Iran have successfully reversed twenty years of foreign policy humiliations, inactions, and catastrophes—and have quelled any notion of the United States’ superpower status being ceded. If one had told previous architects of U.S. interventionism in 2004—Bill Kristol, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, and David Frum—that it would be the host of The Apprentice and a man who plasters his face and name onto steaks and vodka who would topple the Ayatollah and potentially his Islamic Republic—the most powerful of the ‘Axis of Evil’—one would scarcely imagine they could comprehend it.
Throughout this term—and his previous one—critics of the left have relentlessly attacked Mr Trump’s foreign policy as lacking any moral foundation, coherent strategy, or basic stability (at times calling it downright erratic and reckless—talk of annexing Canada and Greenland springs to mind, though that was almost certainly the president just trolling). His rhetoric and actions routinely infuriated the pundit class: those who still worship the post-war internationalist consensus, who cling to human rights conventions and international law like sacred scripture. Yet their endless inaction has done nothing except grant malicious regimes licence to violate those very conventions with complete impunity. This is the same crowd that sneered at Ronald Reagan for daring to call the Soviet Union “an evil empire” and for any serious effort to confront communism or terrorism. They preferred endless concessions dressed up as “détente”—in spite of the irrefutable evidence that, had the U.S. pressed harder and earlier, the Iron Curtain might have fallen a decade sooner. They were wrong then. They’re wrong again now.
Similarly, critics from the “neoconservative right” have oft similarly humiliated themselves with their endless frustrations at Mr Trump’s lack of commitment to ideologically based regime change or ideological fawning over institutions like NATO, or support for Ukraine. Such criticisms are unfounded. Mr Trump has, arguably, done more for NATO than any president in living memory—being the first to demand all member states meet their spending commitments—and being the first president to authorise lethal aid for Ukraine, likely preventing the government in Kiev from collapsing during the 2022 invasion.
Mr Trump will be, without question, the most consequential U.S. president of this era—and due to the inflammatory nature of his person and conduct, his accomplishments likely will never be fully appreciated—yet it is incredible, his success in achieving peace agreements and successful regime change in instances not believed possible.
In his first term, Mr Trump brokered the Abraham Accords, resulting in Israel achieving diplomatic relations with Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Sudan, and Morocco—and moving closer to Saudi-Israel normalisation—without making any progress on Palestinian statehood, despite previous belief such a feat was in the realm of impossibility. National Security Advisor John Bolton and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo—the maximum pressure sanctions campaign—avoided granting the mullahs any legitimacy, and decided only through the strength of Israel, and the Arab states—rallied by Mr Trump—bringing Tehran to heel would any agreements be achieved. Had Mr Trump bought into the framing that Palestine was the singular issue at the forefront, it is unlikely such a coalition could have been mustered. And though, due to his electoral defeat in 2020, and the divergence from this policy under President Biden, the success was apparent—the regime’s reserves fell 94pct—$66b—ignited protests against the government, and hindered Tehran’s ability to supply its proxies—Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and Iraqi Shia militias. The result was a relative calm in the Middle East from 2018 to 2023.
Contrasted with the policies of Ben Rhodes and President Obama, who believed that elevating Iran to a regional power by allowing its nuclear ambitions at a later time and enabling the procurement and building of ballistic missiles would counter both Israel and Saudi Arabia and enable Tehran to compel Israel to withdraw from the West Bank. In the minds of Mr Obama and Mr Rhodes it never occurred that Tehran could be toppled by indirect or direct force, but that there was an inevitable legitimacy surrounding the Ayatollah and that only through peace could Iran’s nuclear ambitions be deterred. Mr Trump’s current success in neutralising the Ayatollah and the bulk of his leadership only shows how American foreign policy regarding the regime—from President Carter with the hostages in ‘79, President Reagan’s failure to respond to the Beirut bombings, the execution of torture of CIA chief William Buckley and SW2 Robert Stethem in 1985, and President Bush’s failure to retaliate for the torture of Colonel Higgins in 1989—could simply have been solved with an air strike. It is truly as straightforward as that.
For irrespective of how this current intervention turns out and whether American forces are compelled to invade Iran, the reality is that Mr Trump has his finger on the pulse for how to effectively mount regime change. Mr Trump has done more than any president in living memory to shake off the “Iraq Syndrome” that has plagued the United States since the unsuccessful military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan of the second Bush administration. The Venezuela operation, conducted meticulously, was prime evidence of the efficiency of the United States military and the success of regime change when deployed effectively.
Rather than waste ten years battling insurgents, billions in rebuilding, and trying to convert foreign populations to Western liberalism while air dropping corrupt leaders like Hamid Karzai who had lived outside the countries for decades to micromanage, the Trump approach is simply to remove elements of a government that are undesirable and elevate those, from within the previous government, who can be reasoned with. Acting President Delcy Rodríguez is from the same ideological bend as Maduro, his Vice President, and in spite of this similarity has freed political prisoners and opened up the country to U.S. investment and oil. Without losing a single American soldier, or expending resources in a complicated transition of governments, rewriting of constitutions, and quelling resistance forces—America simply removed the hostile actor and replaced him with a mild one.
Pearl clutching about international law will likely cease as realpolitik emerges once more as the dominant state of the world. I would argue that this is a development for the best and that worship of the post-war settlement and its institutions has often been excessive and detrimental, doing more harm than good. If the United States can remove a hostile regime, one guilty of numerous humanitarian violations and acting to harm the United States, then why shouldn’t it? Why should those who flagrantly violate international law and commit unspeakable atrocities find themselves under its protection? The West should tackle these regimes the same way it tackled communism under Reagan—by halting them, not trying to change their behaviour. “We win, and they lose.”
Irrespective of whatever happens in Iran, for that is uncertain, and it is likely the war will be prolonged, comfort can be taken that Mr Trump has clearly shown that he will not bog himself in the nation building of yesteryear—that was evident when he ruled out endorsing the the Shah’s son to the throne—and expressed his preference for a more moderate voice from within Iran’s regime, likely from within the IRGC, to be the one to run Iran. It would be wise for the Trump administration’s foreign policy team, steered by the extremely effective Secretary Marco Rubio, to be pragmatic, rather than rigid, with what comes in the wake of the Ayatollah’s demise. For whatever replaces him, no matter how different, is certainly for the best—and be it next week, months, or a year from now the Islamic Republic’s days are numbered and for the first time in a half century hope beckons for the Iranian people and those who wish for a peace in the Middle East.