Syria's Agony

From Ancient Kings to Chemical Weapons, How the War-Torn Levant Became The Poster of Disastrous Diplomacy.

In line with my desire to write about recent events in Syria, my writing has undergone a journey: what began as an informative article on last week's military offensive and my subsequent critiques of previous American foreign policy evolved into a brief history of Assad's regime. Eventually, it was consumed by a need for additional context, leading me to write a five-thousand-word history stretching as far back as the Old Testament. This is likely my lengthiest article to date. It is probably somewhat jarring due to its sheer scope and scale, which may have made it appear somewhat "erratic" in terms of organization and rendered it odd compared to my other writings. Nevertheless, I felt it would be a disservice not to include as much context as possible for what is arguably among the most misunderstood and complex conflicts of our time.

I have divided the article into four sections, each designed to flow cohesively within themselves. These can be read in one extended sitting with your morning cup of coffee or approached as though they were chapters in a book. I have endeavored to keep the historical sections—the first three—distinctly separate from the usual opinionated writing I offer. While they may not be entirely free of bias (for nothing ever is), I aimed to strike a tone of neutrality akin to what one might find in a college textbook.

In terms of accuracy, I suspect there may be some errors here and there, as I am not formally trained in history. However, given the urgency of publishing this article before circumstances shift—since the conflict is evolving rapidly and could render my commentary obsolete—I have applied the typical oversight that I do with any of my other writings. I can state that the material presented is as accurate as possible. I welcome any corrections that may prove otherwise.

Finally, I have opted to use portions of the Old Testament as a source in explaining the ancient history of Syria, for it is one of the few chronicles of this early time that we (being civilization) possesses. Some in mainstream academia may frown upon this choice, and it may invite disagreement about the historical authenticity of the scriptures. Still, please don’t e-mail me about it.

Part I—Syria's Foundations

On 16 May 1916, the seeds for the 21st century's second deadliest conflict were planted from the Sykes-Picot Agreement agreement, penned with the intent of divvying up the centuries-old Ottoman Empire's territories into varying spheres of influence with such negotiations concluding in hushed tones from the machinations of the foremost European imperialist powers—the British Empire and the French Republic, with Syria falling under the ever-widening umbrella of the former. Syria had been an integral province of the Ottoman Empire and prior to the Ottomans, and indeed, the emergence of Islam itself—Syria had been a crucial nexus for both the Abrahamic religions and ancient civilization.

While the modern country, like most, is a product of the last century, the contours of the Syrian nation-state began to take shape thousands of years ago with the civilizations of the Amorites, Arameans, Assyrians, Babylonians, and others who would inhabit the Levant. Stretching back their arrival in the 12th century B.C., the Bible makes specific note of the Arameans, a Semitic people who established city-states, such as Damesk, referred to as early as Genesis 14:15. The kingdoms of Israel and Aram-Damascus, as it was known at the time, came to blows during the reigns of King David and King Solomon, the Israelites waged wars with the Arameans (2 Samuel 8:5-6). David eventually subdued them, making Syria a vassal state, until the Kingdom of Israel’s capitulation to the Assyrian Empire.

The emerging and expanding Assyrian Empire consolidated these city-states into an imperial structure that would later be ruled by the Babylonians, the Persians, and Alexander the Great—his conquest taking place in the 4th Century B.C. Under the Hellenistic period, contemporary Syrian culture became characterized by the influence of Greek and Semitic cultures. Pompey the Great incorporated Syria into the Roman Empire in 64 B.C., resulting in the peak of its prosperity—with cities like Palmyra and Antioch becoming renowned as cosmopolitan hubs of intellectualism, trade, and splendor.

Roman Syria played a pivotal role in the spread of Christianity, with a significant portion of Jesus’ ministry taking place there. The oldest portrait of Christ was found in Syria in 235 A.D. Antioch (where Jesus anointed Peter the Pope) was among the earliest and most influential patriarchates of the fledgling Christian Church. Indeed, it was here that followers of Christ were first called “Christians.” After the Roman Empire was split in the 4th century, Christianity flourished, with varying monastic communities and churches found throughout Syria—though it was during this period the ugly head of sectarian conflict, something that defines Syria in the present-day civil war, emerged.

The Monophysite dispute emerged as one of the earliest theological disputes. Monophysitism, a fringe belief that Jesus could have only one nature, either human or divine, split the early Christian community, with adherents being declared heretics. The internal weakness left it ripe for conquest by the arrival of Islam and the subsequent conquest of Syria by Arab forces after the Battle of Yarmouk in 636 A.D., where Syria became a centerpiece of the Umayyad Caliphate. The advent of the Crusades in the late 11th century brought renewed tumult to Syria as the European forces of Christendom sought to reclaim the Holy Land. The establishment of Crusader states like the Principality of Antioch, after the success of the First Crusade in 1099, temporarily restored Christian rule, but it eventually fell to Sultan Baybars of the Mamluk Sultanate in 1268. Having repelled further Crusader incursions and defeating the Mongols at the Battle of Ain Jalut in 1260, Baybars secured Syria as a bastion of Islamic power.

It is incredibly important to note, particularly in understanding the present day civil war, that despite the rise of Islam and the persistence of Mamluk rule, both the Christian and Jewish populations of antiquity persisted, particularly in mountain communities and cities. Under Islamic law (sharia), both Christians and Jews are considered “People of the Book”, as descendants of Abraham, and thus designated as dhimmi—protected people. In exchange for protection of their life, property, and freedom to practice their religion, albeit limitedly, both Christians and Jews were obligated to pay the "jizya tax", a poll tax to compensate the state for the exemption of military service for non-Muslims, protection, and as a fee to maintain communal, but not political, authority in the Islamic state. Many Christians and Jews served as scholars, administrators, and translators in the caliphates, playing an essential role in preserving and transmitting classical knowledge to the Islamic world.

But they were still second-class citizens, dhimmi would be forced to wear distinctive clothing or badges, marking their religious identity, public displays of faith would be restricted, churches and synagogue construction was forbidden without express permission and such new constructions could not exceed mosques in height, and dhimmi testimony in court is inadmissible against that of a Muslim.

Tensions boiled over festering Islamic sentiment that Christians were present in administrative roles, the perception that they were economically privileged, and accusations of collusion with Crusader forces resulting in the status of Christians as dhimmi became more restrictive. These pressures manifested in anti-Christian riots in 1321 in Syria which led to the destruction of numerous churches and monasteries—local authorities often turned a blind eye to mob violence.

In 1516, Syria was absorbed by the Ottomans after the defeat of the Mamluks at the Battle of Marj Dabiq. Under the new Imperial Ottoman administration, the region was divided into several vilayets, including Damascus and Aleppo, and an unusually calm period of tranquility, stemming from membership of a vast and stable empire. The Ottomans maintained the dhimmi system, and tensions simmered. During the 19th century, Ottoman reforms known as the Tanzimat sought to modernize the empire and integrate its non-Muslim populations more fully. Syria's demographics remained stable for this period, a mosaic of the Abrahamic religions. Christians, who had historically formed the majority, were a sizable minority, concentrated in cities and the mountains alongside the Jewish population, with the majority of the country, obviously, being Sunni Muslim. Significant minority groups such as the Alawites, Druze, and Ismailis were similarly spread out among mountainous areas.

These reforms granted Christians and Jews legal equality in theory, proving incredibly beneficial to Syria’s Christian communities. Jewish communities in Damascus and Aleppo, prospered, save for a notable instance of persecution, such as the infamous Damascus Affair of 1840, This infamous episode involved the accusation of the city’s Jewish community of ritually murdering a Christian monk who had disappeared. Under European pressure, several Jewish leaders were tortured, and some were executed, with many Jews on the street being set up violently by the Ottoman population, thus reminding of the persistent vulnerability of minorities in the caliphate.

Part II—The Colonial Carve-Up & Struggle for Sovereignty

By the early 20th century, the Ottoman state was in decline, its authority eroded by internal dysfunction stemming from rampant corruption, a complete failure to compete with Western Europe’s industrialization, a lack of trade, and the rising tide of nationalist movements. The outbreak of World War I in 1914 proved to be the empire's final undoing. The Ottoman alliance with the Central Powers of Germany and the dual-monarchy of Austria-Hungary drew the ire of their principal opponents—Britain and France who saw the Levant as a strategically vital region for postwar dominance.

Taking advantage of the ensuing chaos, the Hashemite family of Mecca, led by Sharif Hussein, declared a revolt against Ottoman rule in 1916. This Arab Revolt, supported diplomatically and militarily by the British, was fueled by promises of Arab independence after the war. Sharif Hussein's son, Emir Faysal, later King Faisal I, played a pivotal role in the campaign, advancing with his forces into Damascus in 1918, aided by T.E. Lawrence and British forces, which led to the collapse of Ottoman rule in the region and fueled hopes for Arab self-determination.

In 1920, the Arab Kingdom of Syria, under King Faisal I, declared independence, only to be swiftly betrayed by the French. Unbeknownst to the Arab leaders, Britain and France had secretly ratified the Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916—Under this arrangement, Syria and Lebanon were assigned to France, while Britain secured control over Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq. The reign of King Faisal I lasted a mere five months before the French defeated his army at the Battle of Maysalun and sent him into exile.

Syria was then carved into a French Mandate under the League of Nations, with the French deliberately dividing the territory into sectarian sub-states to weaken nationalist aspirations. The era of French imperialism saw the seeds of Syria’s sectarian divisions sown, as the French relied heavily on minority groups like the Alawites and Druze to staff their colonial military apparatus, fostering resentment among Sunni Arab nationalists. Arab nationalist sentiments gained momentum and prominence during the subsequent interwar period, and with the weakening of French power as a direct result of World War II and the emphasis on decolonization and liberal internationalism from the world's new dominant superpower, the United States of America, Syria gained independence in 1946.

Unsurprisingly the newly independent government faced incredible challenges integrating diverse ethnic and religious communities while building a national identity, a process complicated by regional pressures and the fallout of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, in which the newly formed Jewish state repelled the seven armies of the Arab League, including Syria. Trial and error was the de-facto mantra of the regime, as in the new Syrian Republic’s first decade of existence, it had no less than 20 different cabinets and had drafted four separate constitutions—it’s emergent days can be defined by the successive military coups that resulted from the frequent conflict between the political elite and the military.

It is amidst this backdrop in the 1950’s that the Ba’ath Party emerges; advocating borderless Arab nationalism, socialism, and anti-imperialist sentiment. The intent of the founders–Michel Aflaq, Salah al-Din al-Bitar, and Zaki al-Arsuzi–was to form a pan-Arab nation state, united through shared national not theological sentiment, and strengthen their economic equality through socialism to counter the post-war Western order they believed had fragmented the Arab world. The Ba’athists specifically appealed to the rural poor and disenfranchised minorities, particularly Alawites and Druze, who saw the party as a vehicle for upward mobility and political empowerment; these groups could only be protected from discrimination through a pan-Arab vision that transcended religious lines. Christians, as is often the case, are not monolithic politically—many found the Ba'athist ideology of secularism and the rejection of sectarianism quite appealing while looking with disdain at the more radical socialist politics and authoritarian nature, which clashed with the wealthy conservative Christian population's interests.

The Suez Crisis of 1956 proved a pivotal inflection point for Ba’athist ideology, embodying the symbolic and literal collapse of Western imperialism and invigorating the Arab world’s now fervent pursuit of sovereignty and self-determination when Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal, triggered a military intervention by Britain, France, and Israel. In response to the intervention, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower placed a series of unduly measures on the British, threatening to sell U.S. holdings of the British pound—which would flood the foreign exchange market with pounds, thereby leading to a sharp devaluation of the currency—unless they withdrew and refused to supply the Western powers with oil, and worked alongside the Soviet Union in the United Nations to push for a ceasefire.

Though it was a decisive military victory for the Israeli-British-French triumvirate, the canal being captured with ease, they found themselves having exercised themselves for nothing, as the Egyptians had flooded the canal with sunken ships, thereby blocking all travel and making the Suez Canal, in layman's terms, useless. The subsequent failure of this intervention marked the end of the British Empire; the humiliation of the affair, combined with the lack of support from the United States, led to their self-relegation from superpower status and the collapse of Prime Minister Antony Eden’s government. Indeed, for both France and Britain, their status as European colonial influencers disintegrated, and this, in turn, bolstered Arab nationalism across the Middle East. Though defeated on the battlefield, Nasser's defiance against Western powers elevated him as a symbol of Arab resistance, inspiring movements like the Ba'ath Party to view him as the means of achieving their own nationalist and anti-imperialist objectives.

Syria’s union with Egypt in 1958 to form the United Arab Republic (UAR) under Gamal Abdel Nasser was a dramatic, if fundamentally flawed, experiment in Arab nationalism. What initially promised to be the fulfillment of a pan-Arab vision swiftly devolved into what many viewed as little more than a neo-Egyptian empire. Nasser sidelined the Ba’athists, dismantling their party structures and alienating critical Syrian constituencies. By 1961, mounting resentment over Egyptian domination led to the UAR’s collapse, yet another coup in Damascus, and the re-establishment of Syrian independence. To many, the Ba’athists might have appeared a spent force, their lofty dream of transcending borders and sectarian divisions to establish a secular, unified Arab republic seemingly shattered before it could fully take shape.

Yet history, often unforgiving in its irony, would prove otherwise. The Ba’athist movement had only just begun.

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Part III—The Ba’athists Strike Back

In March 1963, Syria underwent a watershed moment when the Ba'ath Party seized power through a coup led by a coalition of military officers and Ba'athist ideologues. One of the more influential figures in the party's military wing, Hafez al-Assad, benefited significantly from the regime change by being appointed Minister of Defence in the new government. Born on October 6, 1930, in Qardaha, Syria, Hafez al-Assad hailed from a modest Alawite family. He joined the Ba'ath Party at its founding as a student activist and later graduated from the Homs Military Academy in 1955 as an Air Force pilot. Though the coup had been successful, the Ba'ath Party's internal schisms began to emerge with the civilian wing, led by Salah Jadid, which emphasized socialism, strict ideological adherence, and cooperation with Egypt and Iraq started to clash with the militarist wing, represented by Assad, more focused on consolidating power within Syria and being less interested in the ideological.

Jadid’s civilian leadership quickly alienated many military officers, whose support was critical to maintaining his control of the country. As Defence Minister, Assad began building a loyal base from 1966 onwards within the armed forces, particularly among his fellow Alawites—many of whom were in the military. In November 1970, Jadid ordered military intervention to support Palestinian forces against the Jordanian monarchy of King Hussein. Still, Assad ostentatiously refused to commit the air force, citing operational and strategic concerns. In reality, it was a political move to undermine the authority of Salah Jadid and humiliate his government, to his success—though it is equally likely that Assad understood that direct intervention against King Hussein would draw the wrath of the United States and Israel, placing Syria in an untenable position and that by withholding the air force's support, which resulted in a decisive military defeat for Syria, would thereby prevent a detrimental success (that being Hussein’s defeat).

For over a year, Assad had become the true power in Syrian politics, and both he and Jadid were set on a collision course. Assad enjoyed immense popularity and loyalty from the armed forces and his strongest constituency came from Syria’s minorities, particularly the Alawites, who saw him as a protector against the Sunni-dominated opposition. It was becoming clear that a decisive power struggle was inevitable.

The tipping point came during the October 1970 Emergency National Congress. Jadid and his supporters sought to condemn Assad, stripping him of his posts, but they failed to account for the tanks and troops that Assad had positioned outside the congress hall. The delegates may have outvoted Assad on paper, but he held the only mandate that genuinely mattered: control of the army and the power of the long rifle.

As the Congress adjourned on, Assad’s men swiftly moved to arrest Jadid and his associates. The operation dubbed the “Corrective Movement,” was executed with surgical precision, avoiding bloodshed but simultaneously leaving no room for doubt about who ruled Syria. Jadid’s feeble final defiance, declaring that Assad would “be dragged through the streets” if power were ever reclaimed, was met with a lifetime prison sentence, marking the end of civilian Ba'athist rule.

Under Assad’s leadership, Syria began adopting a model of centralized authoritarianism designed to stabilize a country that was rampant with ethnic, religious, and political conflict. The “Assad bargain” became the way of Syrian life: political repression, brutal crackdowns of dissent, and the rise of the al-Assad family's hereditary rule and cult of personality were traded for stability, economic modernization, and protection of minority groups. Propaganda emphasized his military insight and wisdom and cast him as a benevolent defender of all faiths and as a champion of Syrian unity.

Hafez Assad understood Syria’s strategic significance as a frontline state in the Arab-Israeli conflict and used this position to cement his domestic and international standing. Hafez’s foreign policy was a masterclass in cold, calculated realpolitik, rooted in a vision of Syria as the linchpin of Arab power, manifested in his intervention in Lebanon’s civil war, which he turned into an arena for Syrian dominance. Intervening under the guise of stabilizing the conflict, Assad’s forces entrenched themselves as kingmakers, balancing Maronite Christians, Palestinian factions, and sectarian militias against one another while ensuring Damascus held the upper hand. Lebanon became less a neighbor and more a satellite—its sovereignty tethered to Syria’s strategic ambitions.

Meanwhile, Assad’s stance toward Israel was defined by a grim pragmatism. Publicly, he framed Syria as the unyielding champion of Arab resistance, as the noble defender of the Palestinian cause, refusing to cede the Golan Heights or entertain peace overtures that compromised his vision of Arab unity. Privately, his policy was one of containment—eschewing open confrontation in favor of supporting proxies like Hezbollah, leveraging the Palestinian cause, and positioning Syria as an indispensable player in any regional settlement. Assad’s foreign policy was not about achieving grand victories nor exporting any ideological sentiment but about securing Syria’s relevance, the survival of himself and his dynasty, and ensuring that no peace or war in the Middle East could proceed without Damascus holding the keys.

One of the defining moments of Assad's presidency was his response to the Muslim Brotherhood. This militant Islamist group has carried out terrorist attacks across the Middle East. It is designated as a terrorist group by the governments of Russia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Syria. It is represented most notably today by Hamas and is a vital opponent of the Assadist Ba'ath party. The Brotherhood was founded in 1928 to re-establish the Islamic Caliphate.

The Brotherhood began an uprising against Assad in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The Brotherhood’s insurgency culminated in the 1982 Hama massacre, which Assad crushed with overwhelming military force, resulting in tens of thousands of deaths. For three weeks, Syrian forces indiscriminately shelled Hama until it was nearly leveled and then sent boots on the ground in a prolonged door-to-door operation to eliminate Muslim Brothers, unsurprisingly resulting in the deaths of tens of thousands of innocents in the process.

The utter destruction of the Islamist uprising sent a clear message: dissent would not be tolerated, with Rifaat al-Assad, Hafez’s brother who commanded the operation, boasting about the number of casualties inflicted. The iron-fist approach maintained a relatively cohesive Syria until Hafez died in 2000 and the subsequent rise of his son, Bashar al-Assad.

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Part IV—Bashar, the Syrian Civil War, and the Present Day

Bashar al-Assad is the most unusual dictator in the world. His ascent to power is more similar to Michael Corleone's in Mario Puzo's The Godfather than any of his peers. At the end of the 1980s, Bashar al-Assad was an ophthalmologist at Western Eye Hospital in London, recalled by those who knew him as “geeky,” humble, and whom nurses thought phenomenal at reassuring anxious patients facing anesthesia. Bashar was an unassuming figure far removed from the political machinations of Damascus, more fascinated by the emerging internet and the power of computing. His elder brother Bassel, the family’s designated heir, was the quintessential strongman nepo baby—a bold, charismatic military officer groomed to inherit Hafez’s iron grip on Syria.

But Bassel’s untimely death in a 1994 car crash upended these plans, and the position of heir apparent fell to Bashar. Bashar was immediately recalled from abroad and thrust into Syrian politics. He enrolled in the military academy and underwent a crash course in statecraft and military strategy—under the stern eye of his father. In anticipation of his ascent, Alawite officers loyal to Bashar were placed in the military, favorable propaganda was spread about the new heir, and Bashar began his political journey as heir by attempting to introduce internet access to Syria, casting himself through action and rhetoric as a seeming reformer.

Upon Hafez’s death in 2000, the machinery of the Ba’athist state moved swiftly to clear the path for Bashar. The constitution was amended to lower the presidential age requirement from forty to thirty-four (Bashar’s age at the time). Within weeks, the mild-mannered doctor became the commander-in-chief of one of the most brutal and tightly controlled regimes in the Middle East.

Initially, the ascent of a doctor removed from Damascus's cutthroat internal politics inspired hope for reform. But this was quelled for various reasons; Bashar al-Assad's authority was anything but absolute. Loyal to his father's legacy, the old guard viewed the Western-educated leader with skepticism, if not outright disdain. Reports suggest that key military figures harbored deep reservations about Assad's leadership, with some allegedly conspiring to undermine his position.

This internal dissent compelled Assad to rely heavily on a coterie of trusted family members and close associates, further narrowing his support base. The Damascus Spring, marked by a brief flowering of political openness, was quickly extinguished as Bashar reverted to his father’s repressive tactics to cultivate a strongman image, ensure his survival, and remove dissidents. His new administration faced challenges with dramatic population growth, dwindling oil revenues, and the destabilizing effects of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 kickstarted more radical elements.

Domestically, Assad's economic reforms—characterized by a pivot towards a market-oriented economy—unwittingly exacerbated social inequalities. The dismantling of state subsidies and the rise of crony capitalism enriched a select elite while marginalizing the rural poor, combined with drought-induced agricultural collapse in the late 2000s, sowing seeds of discontent and kickstarting uprisings.

The eruption of the Arab Spring in 2011 presented an existential threat to Assad's regime. Faced with widespread protests demanding reforms, Assad perceived the unrest not merely as a political challenge but as a direct assault on his survival coming from a fragmented array of Western-backed opposition groups, Kurdish factions, and Islamist extremists. He was likely paranoid and incredibly concerned given the fate of other despots who faced interventions and popular uprisings such as Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi. Security forces were unleashed to quash dissent, employing brutal tactics that escalated the conflict into a full-blown civil war.

U.S. policies under President Barack Obama, often shaped by then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, called for Assad to step down, with Obama declaring, “Assad must go” and Clinton admitting that had she been president, “I would have taken on Assad.” The Obama administration’s early efforts included providing support to opposition factions that, given a failure coupled with a failure to vet rebel groups effectively and a lack of concern, allowed U.S. arms and resources to flow to jihadist groups.

American foreign policy in the Syrian conflict was marked by a simplistic narrative: Assad’s removal was paramount, and the opposition—viewed through rose-tinted glasses—was treated as an undifferentiated force of democratic aspiration. The opposition soon came to be dominated by Jabhat al-Nusra (Al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate) and ISIS. Weapons that President Obama said would be received by moderate democratic resistance groups often ended up in the hands of jihadists. For Assad, this reinforced the narrative that Western powers were backing forces intent on destabilizing the region and empowering jihadist groups to topple his secular government, inviting intervention from the governments of Russia and Iran—to support his regime and prevent a takeover by these elements.

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“We have been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized. That would change my calculus. That would change my equation.”

-Barack Obama, 20 August 2012

In the early hours of August 21, 2013, the Ghouta region near Damascus became the grim theater of modern warfare's most heinous act: a sarin gas attack that claimed the lives of over 1,400 civilians, many of them children. Since 2012, Ghouta had been a focal point of the rebellion with Jaish al-Islam and the Free Syrian Army holding territory here, thereby rendering it strategically critical and persistently contested, with combat entering into a stalemate. Assad's forces, escalating their campaign to secure Damascus periphery, targeted Ghouta with chemical weapons to break the deadlock and terrorize the rebels and the civilian populace sheltering them. Two rebel-held districts—Eastern Ghouta and Western Ghouta—were struck in the early hours of the morning with rockets containing sarin, dispersing a heavy, colorless gas that sank into the basements where civilians had taken shelter from conventional shelling.

Victims exhibited classic symptoms of sarin poisoning—convulsions, pinpoint pupils, frothing at the mouth, respiratory distress, and, in many cases, death within minutes of exposure, with over 355 deaths recorded within hours. The chemical strike, killing thousands, was immediately attributed to the Syrian government by Western powers. The Assad regime, however, denied culpability, and its Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov alleged the attack was a rebel-orchestrated false flag operation. For Obama, the assault posed a geopolitical and moral quandary. Obama, having declared the use of chemical weapons a “red line,” opted against military action in favor of a U.S.-Russian deal for Syria to surrender its chemical stockpile. Western resolve was shown to be weary when, in Westminster, Prime Minister David Cameron was humiliated by a parliamentary vote rejecting intervention, opting to shift Britain’s focus to humanitarian aid, exposing the frailty of Western resolve, which proved to be a boon for jihadist factions like ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra to take advantage.

Concurrently, the Kurdish minority in northern Syria, primarily represented by the People's Protection Units (YPG), seized the opportunity to establish a state. Their effective resistance against ISIS garnered them support from the United States and its allies, with the Kurds proving to be a pivotal force in stabilizing the region. However, this alliance was fraught with geopolitical tensions, particularly with NATO ally Turkey, which views the YPG as an extension of the PKK, a designated terrorist organization. Eventually, President Donald Trump withdrew American troops from northern Syria in 2019, an action that was perceived as a betrayal by the Kurdish forces and left them vulnerable to Turkish military incursions and ISIS remnants.

Vladimir Putin eventually opted to reassert Moscow's influence in the Middle East, beginning in 2015 when he deployed air and ground forces to Syria with the public intention of mounting a campaign against ISIS and Islamist terrorism. However, the operation quickly revealed its true purpose: the stabilization of Assad's rule, the re-establishment of Russia as a geopolitical power broker, and merely taking advantage of the void left by Obama's indecision. Russian airstrikes targeted opposition-held areas indiscriminately, striking not only at jihadist factions but at moderate rebels and civilian infrastructure. Russia began deploying its ground soldiers and embedding Russian advisors within the Syrian military, with Putin positioning Russia as a staunch ally to beleaguered regimes and a guarantor of regional stability, no matter the cost to human lives. Conveniently, it also allowed Putin to secure the Russian naval base of Tartus and the newly built Khmeimim Air Base, cementing a strategic foothold for Moscow in the Mediterranean.

Alongside Russia, Iran opted to intervene to preserve the Assad regime—a linchpin in its "Axis of Resistance." The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), under the aegis of the Quds Force, orchestrated the deployment of military advisors, intelligence operatives, and elite combat units to Syria, collaborating with the Russians. This initiative was spearheaded by Major General Qasem Soleimani, whose presence on the front lines underscored Iran's dedication to Assad's survival. Soleimani's strategic prowess was instrumental in pivotal operations, notably the recapture of Aleppo by the 3-nation armies of Syria, Russia, and Iran in 2016, which marked a turning point in the regime's favor.

Complementing its direct military involvement, Iran mobilized a constellation of Shia militias from across the region and utilized their proxy, Lebanese Hezbollah, which became a formidable force on Syrian battlefields. Concurrently, Iran recruited and deployed units such as the Afghan Liwa Fatemiyoun and the Iraqi Harakat al-Nujaba, weaving a tapestry of proxy forces that bolstered Assad's beleaguered army—while simultaneously allowing Iran to project itself as a regional power capable of exerting its influence abroad, helping to alleviate hardline factions in Tehran. Iran's deepening involvement in Syria exacerbated sectarian tensions, fueling Sunni resentment and contributing to the radicalization that groups like ISIS exploited. By this point, the war had evolved less from a “fight for freedom” and more toward a prolonged, protracted, and incredibly deadly Sunni-Shia civil war.

Last week, the stalemate was broken, as Syrian rebels, led by the jihadist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), formerly Jabhat al-Nusra (the al-Qaeda affiliate), launched an offensive last week that saw them retake the city of Aleppo in less than four days after years of impasse, a consequence from the March 2020 Idlib ceasefire. Hezbollah and Shia militias had redeployed from Syria in an attempt to repel the Israeli ground invasion in Lebanon; however, with the humiliating defeat inflicted by Israel, including a special operation that resulted in thousands of Hezbollah pagers exploding on their owners, Hezbollah and the rest of the Axis, have been incredibly weakened. Russia’s focus has turned away from Syria and toward their failed invasion of Ukraine, which has siphoned much of Moscow’s time and military resources—all while anti-Assad jihadist rebels have had four years to prepare for revolt.

It’s a manifestation of the absolute failure of the U.S. approach to Syria, which I feel compelled to note does not imply excusing Assad’s regime. His government has committed heinous crimes, from indiscriminate barrel bombings to chemical attacks on civilians. It’s extremely unlikely that Syria’s future would be prosperous with Assad at the helm, but it is equally foolish to believe that his ouster is the be all end all solution to Syria’s woes, for this thinking ignores the complexities of a radical opposition and seemed willing to overlook the fact that the Arab governments that may have once called for his removal are now the same parties in negotiations with him presently. The fact is that only Assad has protected the minority Christians, Yazidis, and others while the Islamist groups have often enslaved, raped, tortured, and executed them—it doesn’t take an intellectual to understand that these groups are safer under Assad’s secular dictatorship than a group that is, quite literally, tied to al-Qaeda.

Should HTS and the rebels take over Syria, they will proclaim their caliphate and invoke a hardline approach to Sharia law; ethnic and religious minorities will be murdered in a brutal genocide, much like what happened to Christians when the Islamic State took over the power vacuum. It will create a mass humanitarian crisis as they attempt to flee—the Alawite and Shia face a particularly heightened threat of retaliation from the opposition groups. HTS will then turn its attention to its rival, ISIS, in the East; the potential for this battle reminds me of Kissinger’s prophetic foreign policy: “It’s a pity they both can’t lose.” The collapse of Assad’s regime would invoke celebrations in Washington until it becomes quite obvious that HTS will “breach containment” and that the resurrection of the Islamic State could invite a similar uprising again in Iraq—thus necessitating, once again, intervention and leading to a loss of thousands of lives needlessly.

One wonders if this entire situation was avoidable; a pragmatic approach might have involved engaging Assad indirectly, using his desire for survival as leverage to broker a broader settlement. Assad has cooperated with the West in the past, until the 2010s the West seemed willing to accept the legitimacy of his brutal dictatorship, and his views are more nuanced than the surface level would believe, following the September 11 attacks, Syria emerged as a vital intelligence partner for the CIA in the fight against al-Qaeda, providing unexpectedly valuable information and hosting key operations in the U.S.-led extraordinary rendition program, with “the quality and quantity of information from Syria [having] exceeded the Agency’s expectations.¹” When then British Prime Minister Tony Blair visited Damascus, British officials observed a more measured tone in private, with Assad expressing horror at and criticizing the September 11 attacks and tacitly recognizing Israel's legitimacy.

The Biden administration seems willing to undergo this unsavory, yet necessary negotiation—though this comes after, rather than serving to prevent, his killing hundreds of thousands, his brutal chemical attacks, and other heinous atrocities. Over the weekend, it was reported that American and Emirati officials discussed lifting sanctions on Assad’s regime in exchange for a break with Iran—a counter from Obama’s foolish unwillingness to negotiate any deal, which forced Assad to turn to alternative allies and perpetuated the civil war.

It’s a reminder of the need for realism in foreign policy—not all outcomes align neatly with democratic ideals, particularly in the Middle East. If the Western foreign policy establishment hasn’t figured this out after all that has transpired, then they have utterly failed to learn the lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan. For while Syria’s fate is unknown, and the future of Assad’s regime is likely to be determined by the end of this week or the next, a Western policy driven by idealism, ignorance of history, and untethered to ground realities has exacerbated suffering, destabilized the region, allowed Assad to commit atrocities and kill hundreds of thousands, and tarnished America’s reputation as a reliable partner. As always, it seems in this region, no party will emerge truly victorious, and the losers of the conflict will be the innocents set for persecution whose voices are often unrepresented and fall on deaf ears.

1. Hersh, Seymour M. “The Syrian Bet.” The New Yorker, 21 July 2003, www.newyorker.com/magazine/2003/07/28/the-syrian-bet.